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We provide evidence that culture is a source of pricing bias. In a sample of 1.9 
million auction transactions in 49 countries, paintings by female artists sell at an 
unconditional discount of 42.1%. The gender discount increases with measures of 
country-level gender inequality—even in artist fixed effects regressions. Our 
results are robust to accounting for potential gender differences in art characteristics 
and their liquidity. Evidence from two experiments supports the argument that 
women's art may sell for less because it is made by women. However, the gender 
discount reduces over time as gender equality increases. 
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“[women] simply don’t pass the market test, the value test… As always, the 
market is right.” (Georg Baselitz quoted in Clark, 2013) 
 
“the [auction] market…is certainly one of the key components of our 




Although psychological biases may move prices away from fundamentals, the 
sources of these biases are still unclear. Many biases have biological roots, as the 
neurofinance literature shows. However, biases may also have social roots (Hinton, 
2017). Social context may also moderate the extent to which biological phenomena 
manifest themselves (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1973). The role of social factors 
may be especially important in international contexts. Here we examine the role of 
one social factor, culture, as a potential source of pricing bias across countries. 
We test whether country-level culture, specifically gender culture, affects 
prices using cross-country data on paintings from the secondary art market. We 
expect country-level culture to help explain variation in secondary art prices for 
two reasons. First, art purchases often have both consumption and investment 
motives. Second, art prices in the secondary market are determined by demand, not 
by supply (Mandel, 2009). 
Research on consumption shows that the same product may be valued 
differently by different consumers (e.g., Thaler, 1985). One source of variance in 
price perceptions, and hence demand, may be culture (Akerman and Tellis, 2001; 
Mattila and Choi, 2006; Bolton, Keh and Alba, 2010). For many products, the shape 
of the supply curve will limit the extent to which culture will affect prices. But the 
demand-driven nature of the art market, combined with the notorious variability in 
private valuations of artworks, suggests that culture should play a role in the pricing 
of art. 




We focus on one aspect of culture, gender culture, since it is well 
documented that gender can affect individuals’ valuations of outputs such as work 
(see, for example, the survey by Blau and Kahn, 2017) and that culture modifies 
gender attitudes (e.g., Fernández, 2007). There is also accumulating evidence that 
gender can affect investors’ preferences towards projects (e.g., Gafni, Marom, 
Robb and Sade, 2019; Ewens and Townsend, 2020). In the art world, gender bias 
has also been advanced as an explanation for women’s lack of representation 
among top-ranked artists (Nochlin, 1971). As Allen (2005) writes: 
Asking why women's art sells for less than men's elicits a long and complex 
answer, with endless caveats, entirely germane qualifiers and diverse, 
sometimes contradictory reasons. But there is also a short and simple, if 
unpopular, answer that none of those explanations can trump. Women's art 
sells for less because it is made by women. 
 
If culture is a source of pricing bias, we expect paintings by female artists 
to sell for less than paintings by male artists. Since, as we show, most artists’ 
paintings are auctioned in their country of birth, we also expect the gender discount 
to be bigger in countries with higher gender inequality, controlling for 
fundamentals. Our evidence is consistent with our hypotheses. 
Using a sample of 1.9 million auction transactions from 1970 to 2016 in 49 
countries for 69,189 individual artists, we document that auction prices for 
paintings by female artists are significantly lower than prices for paintings by male 
artists.1 In regressions in which we interact the female indicator with proxies for 
country-level gender inequality in the auction country and include country-year 
fixed effects, we find that the gender discount in auction prices is generally higher 
 
1 Cameron, Goetzmann and Nozari (2019) and Bocart, Gertsberg and Pownall (2018) document 
some gender premia. It is possible that the findings in Cameron et al. (2019) are different because 
they focus on a small sample of artists from the Yale School of Art, which is an elite art school. In 
our Online Appendix, we show that the reason the results in Bocart et al. (2018) sometimes differ 
from ours appears to be due to selection bias: their sample contains substantially fewer female artists 
and transactions for paintings by women than our sample does. 




in countries with greater gender inequality. This suggests that the discount reflects 
an effect of culture on prices. 
One drawback to using the art market to examine violations of the law of 
one price is that no two artworks are the same. To overcome this problem, Pesando 
(1993) focuses on sales of prints from the same series. He argues his evidence 
shows some violations of the law of one price. The identity of the auction house 
appears to matter, for example. He also finds that prints by the same artist may 
command different prices in different countries, although he does not explore the 
mechanism driving this result. 
Mei and Moses (2002) argue that the law of one price is violated if there are 
systematic differences in returns for artworks sold at different auction houses and 
test this hypothesis using a sample of repeat sales of artworks. What is common to 
these approaches to testing violations of the law of one price is that the 
characteristic driving pricing differentials, country or auction house, is not specific 
to the art itself. Thus, to bolster the interpretation that our results reflect a pricing 
bias, we must rule out the idea that art by men and women is fundamentally 
different. 
The art critic Jerry Saltz (2015) dismisses this idea: “No intelligent person 
thinks that art should be seen exclusively through a binary gender lens or bracketed 
in a category of "women’s art."” However, as Nochlin (1971) discusses, the 
proposition that men and women’s art differs has a long history. Since there are no 
formal refutations of the proposition, we must take it seriously. 
Our main identification strategy builds on Pesando’s (1993) argument that 
the law of one price is violated if works by the same artist sell at different prices in 
different countries. If gender culture is a source of pricing bias, we expect a female 
artist to experience a higher average discount for her work in countries with higher 
gender inequality. That is exactly what we find. In artist fixed effect regressions, 
the coefficients on the culture interaction terms are positive for all measures of 




gender inequality. To ensure we are comparing prices for similar artworks, we 
further examine transactions which occur only after the artist died (so the training 
and productivity of the artist can no longer change), and also exploit painting fixed 
effects instead of artist fixed effects (so the intrinsic quality of the artwork is fixed), 
with similar results. 
The artist and painting fixed effect specifications account for any time-
invariant supply-side factor that could lead to a gender discount. They directly 
address an old hypothesis that biological factors would lead women to produce 
systematically worse art (see, for example, the discussions in Nochlin, 1971, and 
Cowen, 1996). They also address the possibility that the gender discount reflects a 
systematic quality difference that can be attributed to women’s historical lack of 
access to art education and resources (see, for example, the discussions in Nochlin, 
1971, and Davis, 2015) or to labor supply-side factors that influence their 
productivity, e.g., child-rearing.2 
These specifications do not necessarily account for time-varying factors that 
may be correlated with culture, however. One possible explanation for our results 
is that the themes and styles in women’s art are simply less appealing to “big-
spending” collectors—the bulk of whom are male, according to Thornton (2008)—
because they do not reflect their personal experiences, especially in countries with 
more gender inequality.3 Evidence that the gender of the investor may matter is 
 
2 Selection arguments would suggest that the average quality of women’s artworks entering the 
secondary market should be better, not worse, than the average quality of the men’s artworks (see 
Cameron et al., 2019; Bocart et al., 2018). However, the importance of selection depends on the 
process through which art reaches the secondary market. Not all auctions emphasize “high art”, so 
works by artists with differing degrees of training can enter the secondary market—in the extreme 
case through auctions of work by “naïve” painters. Variance in quality can also arise because 
“usually art is sold [at auction] because of “the three D’s”: death, divorce or debt, or because 
collectors’ tastes have changed” (Thompson, 2017, p. 24). 
3 While buyer identity at auction events is generally unknown, according to an Art Basel and UBS 
survey (McAndrew, 2020) women represented only 37% of high net worth art collectors in 2019 in 
the 7 countries covered by the survey and Larry’s List (2016) suggests that gender imbalance is even 




suggested, for example by Ewens and Townsend’s (2020) findings that male 
(female) investors express more interest in startups founded by male (female) 
entrepreneurs.  
Nochlin (1971) dismisses the argument that the themes and styles in 
women’s art may not appeal to men. She argues that there are no common qualities 
of “femininity” linking the styles of women artists and that the work of women 
artists is more closely related to the work of their contemporaries than they are to 
each other. However, she lacks quantitative evidence to support her arguments. To 
formally investigate topic differences in art painted by men and women, we use a 
naïve Bayesian classifier of words in a painting’s title to estimate the probability it 
was painted by a woman. 
Our title analysis shows that some topics have a greater gender imbalance. 
Cattle are less likely to be painted by women than roses. This is consistent with the 
idea that female artists may have a specific “style”. But men paint more roses than 
women, so this is also consistent with the idea that female artists are influenced by 
their contemporaries in the period during which they work. Regardless of the 
explanation for the topic imbalance, on average paintings with female-prevalent 
topics are not less appealing to collectors—instead, they command a premium. 
While our title analysis helps rule out the idea that our findings are driven 
by gender differences in “themes”, we also conduct an experiment to provide more 
systematic evidence on the question whether one can identify the gender of the 
artist simply by looking at a painting. For a sample of paintings, half of which were 
by women, participants in the experiment guessed the artist was male 62.7% of the 
time. Overall, participants guessed the gender of the artist correctly 50.5% of the 
time, i.e., their guesses were statistically indistinguishable from random. Of 
 
higher (~18%) at the top end of the market. 




necessity, the sample of artists in our experiment is small. Nevertheless, our 
experimental evidence is consistent with Nochlin’s (1971) and Saltz’s (2015) 
arguments that there is no such thing as “women’s art”. 
Another possible time-varying factor is liquidity. While the art market is 
generally illiquid, illiquidity may be an even greater concern for art by women in 
gender-unequal countries.  If a prospective buyer perceives that the market demand 
for paintings by female artists is lower or art by female artists is more difficult to 
value, it could be rational to apply a discount to paintings by female artists. We use 
past transactions of female artists to construct various measures of liquidity and 
information sets, but do not find that their inclusion changes the interpretation of 
our results. 
We believe our evidence is consistent with the idea that art by women sells 
for a lower price simply because it is made by women. Evidence from two 
experiments supports this interpretation. In Experiment #1, we asked participants 
how much they liked the painting on a scale of 0-10 after guessing the gender of 
the artist. This allows us to measure whether the perceived gender might affect a 
person’s appreciation of the work. In a second experiment (Experiment #2), we 
randomly associated fake male and female artists’ names with images of paintings 
and asked participants how much they liked the painting. To avoid associating fake 
artist names with real paintings, we “created” our own paintings following the 
neural network algorithm by Gatys, Ecker and Bethge (2015). 
In the first experiment, we find that participants who are male, affluent and 
who visit art galleries have a lower appreciation of works they associate with female 
artists than other participants. In the second experiment, we find that affluent 
participants have a lower appreciation of works we associated with a female artist 
name, particularly when they visit art galleries. Since affluent males who visit art 
galleries are most similar to the typical bidder in an art auction, we believe the 




evidence is consistent with Allen’s (2005) hypothesis that “Women’s art sells for 
less because it is made by women”. 
Our paper adds culture to the set of sources of pricing bias (see, for example, 
Lamont and Thaler, 2003) and prices to the set of economic outcomes affected by 
culture (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006; Fernández, 2008). Although we 
focus on country-level gender culture and the art market, the idea that culture 
shapes investors’ preferences is applicable to other dimensions of culture, whether 
national or not, and markets for other assets with subjective valuations. 
Although culture is slow-moving (e.g., Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013), 
it is not immutable. An important question is whether markets respond rationally to 
changes in culture. In a small sample of repeat sales, we find evidence that the 
returns to paintings by women are higher than the returns to paintings by men. This 
is consistent with the idea that the gender discount decreases as gender equality 
increases.  
Our paper highlights the dangers of inferring quality from price. As the 
quotes at the beginning of the paper highlight, this is a common practice in the art 
market. In addition to affecting “the perceptions of an artist’s oeuvre” (Thornton, 
2008, p. 8), prices in the secondary market can affect prices in the primary market 
and alter incentives for creating art (e.g., Galenson and Weinberg, 2000). Thus, this 
practice may partly explain women’s low representation in the art world. Even 
though the artist does not directly participate in the secondary market, outcomes in 
the secondary market can have a profound influence on an artist’s career. 
Many claim that there is a link between culture and women’s low 
representation in the art world (see Nochlin, 1971; Guerrilla Girls, 1998; Reilly, 
2015). Our work suggests that raising awareness about how culture can influence 
prices may help break this link, at least on the demand side. 





Our auction data comes from the Blouin Art Sales Index (BASI), an independent 
database on artworks sold at over 1,380 auction houses worldwide, including the 
two major players Christie’s and Sotheby’s. BASI sources its data from Hislop’s 
Art Sales Index, the primary source of price information in the world of fine art, 
supplemented with catalogue data from auction houses (both electronic and hard 
copy). BASI is presently the largest known database of artworks, containing 
roughly 6.1 million art transactions (almost half of which are for paintings) by more 
than 500,000 individual artists since 1922. 
The characterization of art is complex (see e.g. Bailey, 2020). Even changes 
in basic units of measurement can make comparisons of artworks across categories 
difficult (e.g. the size of a painting has a different relevance than the size of a 
sculpture). To help ensure our analysis is not biased due to measurement error in 
the fundamental characteristics of artworks, we restrict the BASI data to paintings. 
Our analysis focuses on transactions from 1970 to 2016 involving paintings created 
by artists born after 1850 for whom we can identify gender.4 Transactions before 
1970 are relatively sparse and impede a precise estimation of country- and year-
level effects. Moreover, there are very few female artists born before 1850. 
Including these painters would skew our estimation of the effect of gender on 
prices, as we demonstrate in Online Appendix 2. 
Our final sample contains 1,898,849 transactions conducted at more than 
68,000 auctions in 49 countries from 69,189 individual artists. Our sample is the 
largest and most comprehensive data set on auction transactions for paintings to 
date. It is substantially larger than the repeat sales sample in Korteweg, Kräussl and 
Verwijmeren (2016), which consists of a subset of this data, and is roughly 74% 
 
4 The birthyear is missing for 8.16% of observations in the original sample. We exclude those 
observations.  




larger than the sample in Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013), which consists of data 
on 1,088,709 art sales for 10,442 artists from 1957 to 2007. 
Because of their focus on graduates from the Yale School of Art, the auction 
sample employed in Cameron et al. (2019) is substantially smaller. Of the 4,434 
graduates from the Yale School of Art, Cameron et al. (2019) identify only 525 
artists in the BASI data with a total of 10,906 sales. The sample in Bocart et al. 
(2018) is larger (2,677,190 transactions), because it includes other types of art such 
as photographs and sculptures in addition to paintings. But it has worse coverage 
of female painters. It contains only 33,064 transactions for female painters, as 
compared to 141,149 transactions in our sample. Even if we restrict our sample as 
in Bocart et al. (2018) to post-2000 transactions for European and North American 
artists born after the year 1250, our data contains substantially more transactions 
for female painters (83,761). 
For each sold painting in our data set, we have detailed information about 
the artwork, the artist, and the auction it was sold at. We know the painting’s title, 
artist, size, whether it was signed or stamped by the artist, and its medium (e.g., “oil 
on canvas”). The BASI database also categorizes each painting into one of six main 
styles as defined by the auction houses Christie’s and Sotheby’s: 19th Century 
European, American, Asian, Impressionist and Modern, Latin American, Post-war 
and Contemporary, and a residual “Other” style category. For each artist, we 
observe their name, nationality, year of birth, and year of death (where applicable). 
We also know the auction house and the date and location of the auction. Since 
BASI assigns a unique auction identifier to auctions, we can include fixed effects 
at the auction level in our regressions. 
BASI includes an artist identifier, but no painting identifiers or information 
on the artist’s gender. We build a painting identifier based on artist identifier and 
title of the painting. We acknowledge that this indicator is likely to be noisy given 
the fact that artists may use similar names for their paintings, e.g., “Untitled”, and 




that auction houses may use different spellings for a given title. In spite of this 
limitation, we believe that this proxy is still informative. As we show in Figure 5B, 
the evolution of repeat sales indices based on unique artist and painting title 
identifiers follows the evolution of repeat sales indices in a small subsample of 
repeat sales from Korteweg et al. (2016). Nevertheless, to be conservative, we only 
use this painting identifier to confirm results obtained using identifying information 
provided by the data vendor. 
To determine the artist’s gender, we first correct for spelling mistakes in 
artists’ first names and then match them to two lists of names and associated gender 
we compile from various sources. The first list comes from US Social Security 
Administration (SSA) data from 1880 to 2016 (available at 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/limits.html). The second list comes from 
non-American and non-British directors of companies between 2000 and 2016 from 
Boardex. We use data from Boardex because it contains names and gender for 
individuals with 168 different nationalities. 
We classify names as female/male in the SSA and Boardex data if there are 
at least 10 individuals with the same name and 95% of the individuals are 
female/male. If the classification of gender is inconsistent across data sets (e.g., 
female in SSA but male in Boardex) or we cannot classify gender at all using the 
two lists of names, we use a Google search to determine gender. If we cannot 
conclusively verify the gender of an artist, we set their gender to missing. Overall, 
we are able to classify gender for 89% of the starting BASI painting data set. 
In Table OA1.1 of Online Appendix 1, we show that our finding of a 
discount for female paintings is not sensitive to a potential measurement error in 
the assignment of gender. Excluding gender identified through online searches 
(column 1), restricting our sample to the subsample of artists born in the US with 
unambiguous gender (100% of the name occurrences are female/male) according 
to Census data from 1880 to 2016 (column 3), and unambiguous gender according 




to the Census in the year the artist was born (column 4) does not change the 
interpretation of our results. Our results are also robust to examining transactions 
for artists from Western Europe or North America born after the year 1250 for 
whom gender might be easier to classify, as Bocart et al. (2018) argue (column 6). 
The only subsamples in which we do not document a statistically significant 
gender discount is in the sample of artists whose gender could only be identified 
through online searches and a sample of 441 “visible” artists (89 of whom are 
women) whose gender was listed in “Oxford Art Online - Grove Art Online” or 
“The Getty Research Institute - Union List of Artist Names Online”. The fact that 
we document a statistically insignificant, but positive premium in the latter sample 
is consistent with the idea that selection may play a role in particular subsamples 
of female artists as the results in Cameron et al. (2019) suggest. The fact that we do 
not document a statistically significant discount in a sample of artists whose gender 
we were only able to verify through online searches is consistent with our argument 
that gender matters: when it is difficult to infer the gender of the artists (because of 
gender ambiguity of their first name), there is no discount for paintings by female 
artists. 
Art auctions are conducted as ascending bid (i.e., English-style) auctions, 
in which the auctioneer calls out increasingly higher prices. When a bid is solicited 
that no other bidder is prepared to exceed, the auctioneer strikes the hammer, and - 
provided it exceeds the seller’s reserve price - the painting is sold at this highest bid 
price (called the “hammer price”). In our data, all hammer prices are converted to 
US dollars using the spot rate at the time of sale. For the sake of comparability, we 
convert prices into 2016 US dollars using the CPI, but we also show non-inflation 
adjusted results with auction fixed effects to account for the timing of the auction 
in Online Appendix 1. 
We define the variables we use in our analysis in Table 1. Panel A describes 
the painting and artist variables we use in our regressions. Panel B describes our 




measures of gender culture in the auction country. Panel C describes the variables 
we use in our two experiments. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
For the countries in our sample, we obtain five different proxies for gender 
inequality. The first two, the United Nation Gender Inequality Index and the World 
Economic Forum Gender Gap Index, are composite indicators designed to provide 
a comprehensive view of the disparity between men and women within a country 
in terms of educational attainment, political empowerment, labor force 
participation, health, etc. Both variables have comprehensive geographic coverage 
but are available only from the year 2000 onwards. Thus, we use extrapolated 
versions of these measures that backfill the missing observations from the first 
available data points for each country.5 
The remaining three measures are World Bank measures of the percentage 
of women in parliament, the tertiary education enrolment ratio, and the labor force 
participation ratio. These variables capture individual dimensions of gender 
equality (political empowerment, educational attainment, and economic 
participation) and have the advantage of being available in longer time series. Table 
1 describes these variables in more detail. 
All culture variables are increasing in gender equality (higher values 
represent less gender inequality), except for the Gender Inequality Index which is 
defined on a scale of 0 to 1 with zero representing equality. To make the 
interpretation consistent, we redefine this variable as one minus the original value 
of the index. 
 
5 Results are similar if we do not extrapolate. 




Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our auction data sample. Female 
artists account for 16.4% of the population of artists, but only for 7.4% of 
transactions. Consistent with our hypothesis that gender bias should lead to lower 
average prices for female artists’ work, we observe that the mean transaction price 
for male artists is around US $50,480 but the mean price is only US $29,235 for 
female artists. Relative to the average price for paintings by men, the discount for 
paintings by women is 42.1%. 
Not surprisingly, mean auction prices are heavily affected by a handful of 
transactions of “superstar artists” that are not representative of the general market. 
When we exclude transactions above 1 million dollars (which we label as mega-
transactions), the discount drops to 19.4%. If we look at median prices, we obtain 
a similar discount (20.76%). 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
In Panel A of Table 3, we show the evolution of the discount over time. 
While the gender discount for the entire sample is relatively stable over time, when 
we exclude mega-transactions, the discount drops from 33.1% in the 1970s to 
below 22% after 2000 (and to 8.4% after 2010). Since gender inequality has also 
gone down over time, this trend is consistent with the idea that gender inequality 
influences the discount. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
Panel B of Table 3 provides summary statistics on the geographic 
distribution of auction transactions in our sample. Most of our observations are 
from Continental Europe, North America and the United Kingdom. The fact that 
the price discount and the percentage of transactions by female artists varies across 




geographic areas suggests that factors related to the role of women in society may 
be important for explaining auction outcomes. The fact that there are positive 
gender price gaps for the relatively small samples of female artists in Asia and 
Africa is not necessarily inconsistent with this argument. Gender culture can vary 
considerably and can even favor women over men. In fact, five out of six 
matriarchal societies currently in existence are in Asia and Africa (Sawe, 2019).  
Consistent with the idea that gender culture may vary within regions, we 
observe that the relative advantage of female artists occurs for local art styles (such 
as “Asian art”). For more general styles, such as Impressionist and Modern, Post-
war and Contemporary art, we observe a 24.2% discount for the paintings of female 
artists in Asia (with a t-stat of 2.5) and a 51.2% discount in Africa (with a t-stat of 
3.3). 
III. “Women’s art” 
To examine whether our results could be driven by auction participants’ preferences 
for themes in paintings by male artists, we use painting titles to classify the topics 
of paintings. We extend the approach in Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) who use 
topic dummies based on the occurrence of highly used words in the title, such as 
“landscape” and “portrait”, by using a naïve Bayesian classifier with a “bag of 
words” approach to estimate the probability that a painting was painted by a female 
artist given the words in the title of the painting. Appendix A provides the details 
of our approach. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
In Table 4, we show words that are least and most likely to be associated 
with paintings by women in a list of frequently occurring words. The table suggests 




that there is a gender imbalance in some topics. Female artists account for around 
7.4% of transactions in our sample but they account for 15% of the uses of the 
words “FLOWERS” and “ROSES”. At the same time, female artists account for 
only 2.5% of the uses of the word “PAYSAGE” (landscape in French). Thus, 
paintings by female artists are more likely to be still lifes and contain floral themes, 
while paintings by men are more likely to contain landscapes. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
To examine the distribution of topics across genders more systematically, 
in Figure 1 we plot kernel densities for the estimated conditional probabilities that 
a painting was created by a woman for the subsamples of paintings by female and 
male artists. The fact that the densities do not fully overlap is consistent with the 
idea that there is a gender imbalance in some topics. Since there is a significant 
amount of overlap between the two distributions, however, the imbalance does not 
appear to be large. Moreover, no topic is exclusive to one gender—after all, male 
artists account for 85% of the uses of the words “ROSES”. 
 
< Insert Figure 2 about here > 
 
We account for potential gender imbalances in topics by including the 
estimated probability that a painting has been created by a female artist given the 
words of the title, Pr(Female|Title), in our regressions. Table 2 shows summary 
statistics for the estimated conditional probability. Figure 2 shows the distribution 
of male and female artists within subsamples of our transactions by quintiles of the 
estimated conditional probability. 




IV. Gender and auction prices 
According to the World Economic Forum (2020), there is still an overall 31.4% 
average gender gap that remains to be closed globally. If culture is a source of 
pricing bias, we expect paintings by female artists to sell for less than paintings by 
male artists. We test this hypothesis by regressing auction prices on the artists’ 
gender and other controls. In Section V, we test the corollary that the gender 
discount should vary with country-level gender culture after controlling for 
fundamentals. 
To identify the effect of the artists’ gender on the auction price, we control 
for Pr(Female|Title) and more standard artist and painting characteristics (see, e.g., 
Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003), and include year and country or auction fixed 
effects in our regressions. The artist and painting characteristics are the natural 
logarithm of the surface area measured in squared millimeters, a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the painting is signed or otherwise marked, the (natural 
logarithm of) the artist’s age (at the time of the auction), a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the artist was dead at the time of the auction, and style and medium 
fixed effects. The country fixed effects control for potential omitted variables 
related to the art market and women’s participation in the art market. The auction 
fixed effects control for potential omitted variables specific to the auction the 
painting is sold at, such as the characteristics of the auctioneer, the auction house, 
the clientele, and the characteristics of the collection that is being sold, e.g., its size 
and theme.  
While controlling for these factors may be important, we note that the 
inclusion of auction fixed effects may come at a cost. In our sample, 49.85% of the 
auctions (accounting for 18.43% of the transactions) have no transactions involving 
female artists, and only 33.43% of auctions (accounting for 68.3% of the 
transactions) sell more than one painting by a female artist. Since gender may 




partially explain the allocation of art to auctions, the auction fixed effects 
specifications may over-control and, thus, underestimate the size of the gender price 
gap. 
We sharpen the fixed-effect identification by restricting our sample in 
various ways. As a first step towards controlling for potential differences in training 
or other personal characteristics (such as networking ability) that may influence the 
price, we restrict our sample to a subsample of data in which artists only appear if 
they have at least 20 transactions in our sample, which is roughly 22% of artists 
(who collectively account for 87% of transactions). We also restrict our sample to 
artists who were deceased at the time of the auction (74.9% of transactions) to help 
rule out any supply-side influence by the artist on prices at the time of the auction. 
Table 5 shows regressions of auction prices on a dummy that is equal to one 
if the artist is female, the estimated probability of being a female artist given the 
words of the title, the (natural logarithm of) the artist’s age (at the time of the 
auction), a dummy variable that is equal to one if the artist was dead at the time of 
the auction, the natural logarithm of the surface area measured in squared 
millimeters, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the painting is signed or 
otherwise marked, and the various fixed effects including style and medium fixed 
effects, country and year and auction fixed effects. While these fixed effects 
account for country, year and auction-specific correlation in the residuals, art price 
residuals may also be correlated within a country-year or a country-year gender 
group because current events influence the demand for art. As a result of the Black 
Lives Matter Movement, for example, the demand for art by Black artists increased 
(e.g. Pickford, 2020). Thus, we cluster the standard errors in our price regressions 
in Table 5 and the rest of the paper at the country-year-gender level. The 
interpretation of our results does not change if we cluster standard errors at the 
country-gender level or double cluster at the country and year level, following 
Petersen (2009).  




Because auction prices are truncated and extremely skewed, our dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted auction prices. In Online 
Appendix 1, we show that accounting for skewness in prices by restricting our 
sample to transactions of paintings that sold for less than $100,000 or using quantile 
regressions instead of OLS does not change the interpretation of our results. Since 
inflation may vary by country, we also show that our findings are robust to using 
non-inflation adjusted prices with auction fixed effects to account for time and 
location effects. In Online Appendix 2, we show that the interpretation of our results 
is robust to using different specifications as in Bocart et al. (2018) and highlight 
that selection seems to be the main reason why they find a gender premium in some 
specifications. 
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the regression results of auction prices on the 
Female Painter dummy and year and country fixed effects. In column 2, we replace 
the Female Painter dummy with the estimated probability of a female painter given 
the title of the painting. In column 3, we consider both variables together. In column 
4, we include additional control variables. In column 5, we replace country and year 
fixed effects with auction fixed effects. In columns 6 and 7, we re-estimate the 
model specifications in columns 4 and 5 after excluding mega transactions. At the 
bottom of Table 5 we report the coefficients on Female Painter and Pr(Female|Title) 
in the regressions restricted to the subsamples of artists with at least 20 transactions 
or deceased artists at the time of the auction.  
 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
 We note that our results are not consistent with the idea that the themes in 
“women’s art” are not appealing to collectors. If anything, female-prevalent topics 
command a premium, not a discount. Across all specifications, the coefficients on 




Pr(Female|Title) are positive and statistically significant at greater than the 1% 
level. But, regardless of topic, art by women is valued less. The gender price 
discount persists after addressing potential omitted variable biases, even in the 
restricted sample. In the unrestricted sample, the magnitude of the discount in log 
prices varies between 21.2% (with country fixed effects in column 4) and 9.9% 
(with potentially overcontrolling auction fixed effects in column 7). The discount 
decreases for more prolific artists in the restricted sample, but the magnitude of the 
discount is similar since the mean prices are higher in the restricted sample. 
V. Culture and the gender discount 
We expect the gender discount to be bigger in countries with higher gender 
inequality, controlling for fundamentals. Local attitudes can directly affect how 
much is bid in auctions. Local attitudes can also inform pre-sale estimates of art, 
and hence auction outcomes (see, e.g., Mei and Moses, 2005), because auction 
houses use information they solicit about clients’ preferences through pre-show 
cocktail parties and social events in setting their estimates (as discussed in, e.g., 
Bruno, Garcia and Nocera, 2018).6 Local attitudes may also influence how the 
auction is conducted, for instance through the employment of local auctioneers. As 
Lacatera, Larsen, Pope and Sydnor (2016) show, auctioneers can affect bidding 
outcomes. On the other hand, the increased prevalence of online bidding should 
make it more difficult for us to detect an effect of local culture. 
To test the hypothesis that culture affects prices, we first augment our 
regressions with auction-country-level variables that proxy for cultural attitudes 
 
6 We do not focus on auction house price estimates in our analysis because our data set has poor 
coverage of estimates in earlier years. For the sample of paintings for which we have estimates, the 
correlation between the midpoint of the estimate and the hammer price is 0.93. Not surprisingly, our 
results are similar in the sub-sample of auction house estimates. 




towards women and their interactions with the artist’s gender and Pr(Female|Title). 
In the next subsection, we build on Pesando’s (1993) argument that the law of one 
price is violated if works by the same artist sell at different prices in different 
countries by adding artist fixed effects or proxies for painting fixed effects to these 
regressions. 
We estimate the following regression: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛿𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 
+ 𝜆𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜂𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 × 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 +  
 
In this regression, we are primarily interested in the coefficient on the 
interaction coefficient 𝜆. To identify 𝜆, we include the interactions between the 
natural logarithm of per-capita GDP and the artists’ gender and Pr(Female|Title) to 
ensure the interactions with culture do not simply reflect non-linear effects of 
economic development.7 To capture other (possibly time-varying) country-level 
confounding factors, we include country-year fixed effects (as well as fixed effects 
for style and medium of the painting). This makes it impossible to estimate the 
coefficients on our measures of culture directly, however we can still estimate the 
coefficients on their interactions with the female dummy variable. Since we analyze 
the relative effect of country-year cultural variables on male and female artists, we 




7 The results are similar without the GDP interactions and are available on request. 




< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions for the five measures of 
culture. To aid comparisons of uninteracted gender effects across models, we also 
show Female Painter coefficients from models in which all interaction variables 
are normalized to be mean zero within sample at the end of the table.8 Four of the 
estimated 𝜆 coefficients are significant at greater than the 1% level, and all of them 
are positive, which suggests that an increase in gender equality in the country of 
auction is associated with a lower auction price discount for paintings by female 
artists. Consistent with the idea that attitudes towards women explain part of the 
discount, we also find that the premium for Pr(Female|Title) is generally higher in 
more gender equal countries.  
 
< Insert Figure 3 about here > 
 
To illustrate the economic importance of these coefficients, we present in 
Figure 3 estimates of the gender price gap for values of the culture variables in a 
±1 standard deviation range around the mean. If we consider, for example, the 
percentage of women in parliament, we see that paintings of female artists sell at a 
37.68% discount in countries/years where this percentage is “low” (12.70%, one 
standard deviation below the mean) but sell at a 6.97% discount when the 
percentage is “high” (31.38%, one standard deviation above the mean). In the same 
way, we estimate a gender price discount of 34.22% when gender inequality is 
“high” according to the UN Gender Inequality Index, but a discount of 6.81% only 
when inequality is “low”. 
 
8 We thank the referee for this suggestion. 




V.1 Artistic talent/style  
To identify culture as a source of pricing bias, we follow Pesando (1993) in 
examining whether works by the same artist sell at different prices in different 
countries. We also follow Baumol (1986) and Mei and Moses (2002) by examining 
whether the same painting sells at different prices in different countries to identify 
violations of the law of one price. To examine the relationship between culture and 
prices while holding the identity of the artist or painting fixed, in Table 7 we add 
artist fixed effects (columns 1-5) and our proxies for painting fixed effects (columns 
6-10) to the specifications in Table 6. 
To be able to identify the coefficients on the interaction 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 ×  𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, the work of an artist must be sold in different years 
and different countries that vary in their gender culture. Cameron et al. (2019) 
document that the works of 525 graduates from the Yale School of Art were 
auctioned in 36 different countries. In our sample, 83.25% of transactions belong 
to artists whose paintings are sold in more than one country. This percentage 
increases to 89.15% in the subsample of artists for whom we have at least 20 
transactions on record. 
While including artist fixed effects cannot help us rule out the possibility 
that the skill or style of an artist may evolve over time, it allows us to rule out the 
idea that systematic skill or style differences drive the difference between prices of 
male and female artists. With the inclusion of artist fixed effects, we are no longer 
able to estimate the average gender price discount. However, we can still estimate 
the coefficient on the interaction between the Female Painter dummy and our 
gender culture proxy variables. 
 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
 




After adding artist fixed effects (together with country-year and medium 
fixed effects), we observe that the coefficients on the interactions of Female Painter 
with culture are positive for all the culture indices in Table 7.9 The coefficients on 
the interactions between Pr(Female|Title) and culture are consistent with the 
interactions between Female Painter and culture. The coefficients are all positive 
and highly significant. For a given painter, collectors appear to place a higher value 
on paintings of female-prevalent topics in more gender equal countries. 
We note that the 𝑅2 of the regressions increases significantly from 25% – 
27% in Table 6 to 75% – 78% in columns 1-5 of Table 7. This is consistent with 
the idea that individual artist effects are extremely important for understanding 
auction outcomes. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss whether the 
individual effects reflect objective differences in talent or style. Our goal here is 
simply to show that even after accounting for fixed individual effects, the difference 
between the average auction prices of paintings by female vs. male artists is related 
to variables that measure the inequality between women and men in society. 
The results of the model specifications that include our proxies for painting 
fixed effects in columns 6-10 of Table 7 support the idea that gender inequality 
matters for auction outcomes. To the extent that artists do not use the same painting 
title throughout their lives, our proxies for painting fixed effects control for cultural 
characteristics specific to the period during which the painting was painted and the 
quality of the art itself—not just the talent of the artist. Since it is relatively rare for 
a painting with the same title by a given artist to be sold in multiple countries, the 
samples in columns 6-10 are smaller than in columns 1-5. Nevertheless, the 
coefficients on the interactions of Female Painter with culture remain positive and 
highly significant in some specifications. 
 
9 In this specification we drop style fixed effects since in our dataset artists are allocated to a single 
style. 




V.2 Liquidity and uncertainty about quality 
The artist and painting fixed effect specifications do not necessarily account for 
time-varying factors that may be correlated with gender culture. One possible time-
varying factor is liquidity: if a prospective buyer perceives that the market demand 
for paintings by female artists is lower, it could be rational to apply a discount to 
paintings by female artists. If collectors base their assessment of the quality of a 
woman’s work on other work by women, it could also be rational to apply a 
discount to paintings by female artists. In this case, the set of reference works for 
female artists will be smaller so valuation uncertainty will increase.  
This reasoning does not question the existence of a gender-motivated price 
gap but proposes (subjective) risk assessments and liquidity concerns as the channel 
through which culture operates.  
If subjective risk assessments or liquidity concerns drive the relationship 
between gender culture and prices, it must be the case that subjective risk or 
liquidity varies by country and is linked to gender inequality. If buyers were to use 
a worldwide sample of past transactions to assess the quality or liquidity of female 
artworks, then these estimates would not vary per country and could not generate a 
country-specific gender price gap. Culture-related valuation uncertainty and 
liquidity should thus be primarily driven by country/market information. 
We exploit the history of sales by female artists in a country to construct 
our primary measure of liquidity, which is the natural log of one plus the number 
of auction sales of paintings by female artists in that country over the past ten years. 
As this measure increases, the market for paintings by female artists in a country 
and year should appear more liquid and more information will be available to 
estimate subjective risk. We also consider a number of variations on this measure 
that allow for a longer “memory” (using all transactions since 1970), a shorter 
memory (using only the past 5 years of transactions), a more restricted information 




set in the style dimension (10 years of transactions in the same style), and a more 
restricted information set in the auction dimension (10 years of transactions from 
the same auction house). 
In untabulated analyses, we find that these “liquidity” measures are 
positively correlated with economic development (as measured by per-capita 
GDP). Their correlations with our cultural variables are less uniform but are also 
positive in most cases, which suggests that more artworks by female artists are sold 
in more gender-equal countries. 
In a similar way, we exploit the prevalence of female artists to proxy for the 
information a prospective buyer may use to assess the quality of a female artist’s 
work. We count the number of female artists born in the country of a given 
transaction in the fifty years prior to the year of the transaction. We also consider 
the percentage of artists born in a country in the last fifty years who are female.  
To examine whether liquidity concerns or uncertainty about quality drive 
our results, we augment our models in Table 7 with interactions between the artist’s 
gender and our measures of liquidity or the prevalence of female artists, as well as 
with Prob(Female|Title) and GDP, as in our prior analysis, as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝛼 + 𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒) + 𝜆𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝜂𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒) × 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛾𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒) × 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
+ 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 𝐴𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  
 
In Table 8 we report the estimated coefficients, focusing on liquidity 




variables in Panel A and the prevalence of female artists in Panel B.10 In several of 
our specifications, the liquidity and female prevalence measures correlate with the 
relative pricing of paintings by female artists vs. paintings by male artists. However, 
since the interactions between gender and culture remain statistically and 
economically significant after accounting for the additional variables (similar to the 
results in Models 1-5 in Table 7), liquidity or uncertainty about quality do not seem 
to be the main channel driving the relationship between gender culture and prices. 
 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
 
V.3 Limits to the law of one price and the returns to investing in women’s 
artworks 
In the absence of transaction costs, collectors should exploit culture-induced 
pricing biases by selling paintings by female artists in more gender-equal countries. 
The fact that the correlations between our sales-based liquidity measures and 
gender culture are generally positive suggests that some arbitrage may be occurring. 
However, in the absence of complete gender parity, the gender discount may 
persist. Moreover, it is well known that, similar to the real estate market, transaction 
costs in the art market are high. Despite the absence of systematic data on these 
costs, our sample allows us to shed some light on the forces that may either maintain 
or reduce cultural pricing biases. 
Cultural pricing biases could persist if most art is sold locally. They could 
also persist if there is little variation in cross-country culture that might motivate 
across-market sales. In the context of gender culture, pricing biases could persist if 
 
10 Including both liquidity and female prevalence variables in the same regressions does not change 
our conclusions. 




markets are more segmented for female artists. But the significant variation in 
gender culture across countries should spur cross-country arbitrage. 
We consider an artist’s market to be more segmented when more of their 
work is sold in their birth country. Besides transaction costs, such as transportation 
and insurance costs, name recognition could also be a reason to auction locally. If 
we measure the “fame” of an artist by the number of lifetime sales in our sample, 
we observe that a higher proportion of the work by unknown artists is sold in their 
country of birth (73.6% for artists in the first quintile vs. 63.2% for artists in the 
fifth quintile of lifetime sales). If we use the life-long average sale price as an 
alternative proxy for the artist’s fame, this proportion becomes higher. In general,  
only 21.8% of transactions in the lowest price quintile are executed outside the 
artist’s country of birth vs. 43.7% of transactions in the highest quintile.  
Since art prices are on average lower for women, it is plausible that art 
markets are more segmented for women than men. Consistent with this argument, 
we find the percentage of sales executed outside an artist’s home country is 28.8% 
over our entire sample, but higher for men (29.1%) than women (24.5%). Using a 
simple logit model in which gender is interacted with time indicators, we can 
estimate time trends in the probability artworks by male and female artists are sold 
abroad. Figure 4 shows that the likelihood artworks by women are sold abroad has 
been persistently lower than for men since the 1980s. 
 
< Insert Figure 4 about here > 
 
We can examine the potential role of arbitrage in reducing cultural biases 
by modelling the likelihood an artist’s work is sold abroad as a function of birth 
country culture. We estimate a regression of the probability an artist’s work is sold 
outside their country of birth as a function of a gender dummy, a country/year-level 
proxy for gender culture in the country of birth, and their interaction. We control 




for the year of the transaction, style and medium of the painting and other controls 
as indicated in Table 9. While we control for the (log of) per capita GDP in the birth 
country of the artist (and its interaction with the gender indicator) as a proxy for the 
development of the local art market, we can no longer include (birth) country fixed 
effects in this analysis. While an artist can sell in multiple countries (the transaction 
country as in the rest of our paper), she or he has a unique birth country. 
In Table 9 we observe that the interaction between the female indicator and 
birth-country gender equality is negative and statistically significant for three out 
of five of our culture measures. Paintings by female artists are more likely to be 
sold abroad, relative to paintings by male artists, if their countries of birth exhibit 
greater gender inequality in terms of tertiary education enrolment, labor 
participation, and the WEF Gender GAP Index. 
 
< Insert Table 9 about here > 
 
The magnitude of this effect is economically large. If we consider labor 
force participation as our measure of gender equality, we observe that in countries 
with higher levels of gender equality (mean plus one standard deviation), the 
probability of a foreign sale of a painting by a female artist is 4.43% lower than for 
a painting of a male artist. In countries with lower levels of gender equality (mean 
minus one standard deviation), the probability is 5.06% higher. Considering that 
the unconditional likelihood of a painting being sold outside the birth country of 
the artist is only 28.8%, these differences can be considered economically 
meaningful. 
The results in Table 9 suggest that cultural differences may spur arbitrage: 
collectors appear to respond rationally to different valuations of artworks across 
countries. We should also expect collectors to respond to changes in culture, in this 
case, increasing gender equality, over time. If so, prices for artworks by women 




should grow at a faster rate, and exhibit higher returns, than prices for artworks by 
men. Although the time trend in the discount we document in Table 3 is consistent 
with a higher growth rate in prices for artworks by women, we can examine this 
possibility more systematically by using the subsample of repeat sales of paintings 
identified in Korteweg et al. (2016) and our identifiers for unique artists and 
painting title combinations. 
The Korteweg et al. (2016) sample consists of 63,622 transactions of 30,655 
unique paintings by 8,449 artists, 541 of whom are women. Following Bailey, Muth 
and Nourse (1963), we construct monthly repeat-sale price indices with base year 
1970 for the subsample of paintings by women and the subsample of paintings by 
men and plot them in Figure 5A. 
 
< Insert Figure 5 about here > 
 
Although the sample of repeat sales is small, the trends in the indices are 
consistent with our evidence that the discount is decreasing as gender equality 
increases: the returns to paintings by women are higher than the returns to paintings 
by men. In Figure 5B, we show the result of constructing monthly repeat sales price 
indices using repeat sales we identify based on our proxy for unique paintings 
(unique painting title for a given artist). The trends in the indices are similar to those 
in Figure 5A.  
VI. Is gender in the eye of the beholder? Experimental evidence 
For policy purposes, an important question is what the channel is through which 
culture influences art prices. Our hypothesis is that a buyer’s valuation is influenced 
by their cultural attitudes. However, it is also possible that the conduct of the 
auction is a source of bias. While our auction fixed effect results already suggest 




that auction mechanics cannot fully explain our results, experiments can help us 
strengthen the interpretation of our results.  
To examine the potential relationship between an artist’s gender and the 
perceived value of their art we conduct two experiments using surveys.11 For our 
experiments it is crucial that the participants do not recognize real paintings we use 
in the experiments. It is also crucial that the participants can be “fooled” by fake 
paintings. These requirements make actual art collectors less desirable as 
participants, although we also note that in other contexts, such as blind wine 
tastings, experts have been known to perform poorly (e.g., Hodgson, 2009).  
Since in principle anyone can bid at auction,12 we use SurveyMonkey® 
Audience services to identify samples of participants that are representative of the 
U.S. population in terms of gender, age, income and geographical distribution.13 If 
the participants in our experiments were more influenced by gender culture than 
the typical art collector, the results of our experiments would not readily generalize. 
However, we believe it would be difficult to make this argument given the male 
dominance of the art world at all levels and our evidence that the art market appears 
segmented. For each participant, SurveyMonkey provides data on gender, age and 
income range. In the surveys, we ask for additional information related to 
educational attainment, frequency of visits to art galleries or exhibitions, state or 
U.S. territory of residence and family background (country of birth of both parents). 
We conducted Experiment #1 two weeks apart from Experiment #2. We 
surveyed 1,000 participants in the first experiment and 2,000 in the second. The 
 
11 Both experiments received Human Ethics approval. 
12 For instance, to bid in a Christie’s auction, bidders create an account by supplying their contact 
details, along with a government issued photo ID and proof of address. For certain transactions, 
bidders may be asked for a financial reference and/or a deposit as a condition of allowing them to 
participate in the auction. 
13 The responders are drawn from a large pool of participants in the SurveyMonkey Contribute 
program. Enrollees in this program agree to participate in periodical surveys in exchange for 
donations made to their charity of choice. 




numbers of participants were dictated by funding constraints. Since Experiment #1 
involved more questions, it was more expensive to conduct than Experiment #2. 
Because of missing data on income in SurveyMonkey, we end up with responses 
for 880 (1,823) participants in Experiment #1 (#2). While SurveyMonkey assured 
us that the likelihood the same individual would take part in both experiments was 
“extremely low”, to increase confidence that our participant pools are distinct, we 
merged the two samples on all common characteristics (age, gender, income, 
reported family background, and state) to determine a potential overlap between 
them. We calculate that the samples overlap by at most 90 individuals. The results 
of dropping these individuals from our analysis are similar to the results using the 
full sample and are available on request. 
Table B1 in Appendix B provides summary statistics for the two 
experimental populations as well as Chi-squared tests for the null hypothesis that 
the two populations are equal. Online Appendix 3 shows the surveys we used in the 
experiments and summary statistics for the appreciation scores by guessed gender 
(Experiment #1) and associated gender (Experiment #2). 
VI.1 Experiment #1: Can you guess? 
In our first experiment we ask our test subjects to look at a sample of paintings and 
a) guess the gender of the artist, and b) rate how much they like the artwork on a 
scale from 0 to 10. This experiment allows us to address two separate, but related 
issues. First, we are interested in examining whether it is possible to guess the 
gender of the artist by looking at a painting. If paintings by female artists have 
visually distinctive characteristics, there could be a taste-based explanation for the 
gender price discount we document that has nothing to do with the gender of the 
artist per se. This experiment also allows us to measure the effect of perceived (as 
opposed to actual) gender of the artist on the artistic appreciation of the artwork. 
The presence of such an effect would reinforce our main argument that the gender 




price gap is at least partially culturally motivated. 
To conduct the experiment, we use a sample of ten paintings. To keep our 
selection as neutral as possible, we choose the ten paintings from the first paintings 
in our sample auctioned at the beginning of 2013. We impose the following 
restrictions on the selection: a) five paintings from male and five from female 
artists; b) only one painting per artist; c) painting’s hammer price below US 
$100,000 (to ensure the paintings are relatively unknown); and d) availability of an 
electronic image with sufficient resolution. Table B2 in Appendix B describes our 
sample of the 10 paintings. 
Each subject in our experiment is shown a random selection of five out of 
these ten paintings. After looking at each painting the subject is asked to guess: a) 
the gender of the artist; b) the place of birth of the artist (among a selection of six 
broad geographical areas); and c) the approximate period in which the painting was 
created (among a selection of three possibilities). Each participant was also asked 
to rate the painting on a scale of 0 – 10 based on subjective artistic appreciation 
(“How much do you like this painting?”). While we do not have any prior about the 
participants’ ability to guess the place of birth of the artist and the period of creation 
of the painting, we use these two additional questions to avoid making it too 
obvious that our primary interest is in the perceived gender of the artist. 
Table 10 summarizes the participants’ ability to correctly guess the gender 
of the artist by looking at a painting. The table shows the name of the artist, the title 
of the painting, the artist’s gender, the estimated probability that the artist is female 
based on the words in the painting’s title, and the percentage of participants who 
guessed the artists’ gender was male or female. Overall, participants guessed the 
artist is “Male” 62.7% of the time in the entire sample. 
The fact that the frequency of “Male” guesses is significantly above 50% 
indicates that the respondents expect a higher incidence of male vs. female painters. 
In part, this may reflect respondents’ limited exposure to women as artists. 




Historically, women have been underrepresented in art history books (Galenson, 
2009). For instance, not a single female artist appeared in H.W. Janson’s History of 
Art, a definitive art history book, until the year 1987. The percentage of art by 
women in museums, art fairs and galleries is also much lower than 50% (Reilly, 
2015). As a result, female artists also receive less press coverage than men. 
 
< Insert Table 10 about here > 
 
Consistent with the idea that respondents who are likely to have more 
knowledge of art are more likely to guess “Male”, we document in Table 11 that 
the probability of answering “Male” is higher for older, more affluent and better 
educated respondents. However, we also observe that the proportion of “Male” 
guesses does not differ significantly by the gender of the respondent or the 
frequency of visits to art galleries. 
 
< Insert Table 11 about here > 
 
The proportion of “Male” guesses was roughly the same (~63%) for the five 
paintings by male artists and the five paintings by female artists. Globally the 
frequency of correct guesses was 50.5%, which is statistically indistinguishable 
from a random guess. The only painting for which a significant majority of 
respondents guessed a female artist is a painting of a vase of flowers, Vase de fleurs 
au pichet vert, painted by Marie Lucie Nessi-Valtat. The fact that we also assign 
this painting a high estimated probability that the artist is female (71.19%), suggests 
that some topics are perceived as being more “feminine”. 
Just because a representative sample of individuals is unable to correctly 
guess the gender of an artist by looking at a painting is not per se proof that there 
are no structural differences between the artistic production of male and female 




artists. However, it is suggestive that any structural differences that might exist are 
not readily observable. In addition, the experiment provides us with a measure of 
“perceived gender” that is orthogonal to the actual gender of the artist. Using 
“perceived gender” allows us to measure the effect of gender perceptions on the 
artistic appreciation of a painting. 
In Table 12 we report the results of OLS regressions of the appreciation 
score of each painting on the perceived gender of the artist, Female Guess, which 
is equal to one if the respondent guessed the artist is female, as well as 
Pr(Female|Title), and dummy variables that proxy for respondent characteristics. 
Affluent is equal to one if the respondent has a family income above $100,000; Art 
Expert is equal to one if the respondent visits a museum or art exhibition at least a 
few times a year; Male is equal to one for male respondents; Mature is equal to one 
for respondents in the 45-59 and 60+ age groups; College Educated is equal to one 
if the respondent has a college degree. In every model, we also control for 
respondents’ guesses concerning the perceived period of the painting and the 
perceived geographic origin of the artist. We also control for participants’ responses 
about their parents and state of residence. In column 10, we include painting fixed 
effects to control for the characteristics of the individual artworks as well as the 
actual gender of the artist. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. 
 
< Insert Table 12 about here > 
 
In column 1 of Table 12, we report the regressions of the appreciation score 
on Female Guess and controls. On average, it appears as if participants like 
paintings they think are painted by women more. However, as columns 2 and 3 
suggest, this appears to be driven by the themes of the paintings. When we add 
Pr(Female|Title) to the regression, we see that the coefficient on Female Guess 
becomes insignificant and decreases in magnitude. In contrast, the coefficient on 




Pr(Female|Title) is positive and significant at greater than the 1% level. This finding 
provides external validity for our previous result that female-prevalent topics 
appear to command a premium at art auctions. 
In columns 4-10, we add interaction terms between Female Guess and 
respondent characteristics. The coefficients on all interaction terms except Female 
Guess x Mature and Female Guess x College Educated are negative and 
significant.14 Respondent who are male, affluent respondents, and respondents who 
often visit art galleries appreciate paintings less when they perceive the artist to be 
female. For example, for male respondents the perceived femininity of the painter 
is associated with a 0.64 reduction in appreciation, which represents a roughly 
12.9% “discount” from the average score. 
The fact that the perceived gender of the artist is related to respondents’ 
appreciation is consistent with our hypothesis that attitudes towards women can 
play a role in explaining the gender price discount we document in earlier. The fact 
that affluent males who visit art galleries appreciate paintings by artists they believe 
to be female less is particularly striking as these respondents are likely to be the 
most similar to participants in auction markets. 
VI.2 Experiment #2: What’s in a name? 
While the results of this first experiment support our main hypothesis, they do not 
represent a direct test that gender attitudes are reflected in auction prices. To test 
this hypothesis more directly, we design a second experiment in which we again 
ask our participants to rate how much they like ten paintings on a 0 – 10 scale. The 
difference to Experiment #1 is that the participant sees a randomly drawn male or 
female artist’s name beneath the painting before scoring it. 
 
14 Coefficients on the interaction terms are similar if we include participant fixed effects in addition 
to painting fixed effects. 




To avoid ethical issues related to misattribution of real paintings we 
generate the ten images using the algorithm described in Gatys et al. (2015), which 
is available online at https://deepart.io/. The authors develop an artificial system 
based on a Deep Neural Network that creates artistic images of high perceptual 
quality. The system uses neural representations to combine content from an image 
(in our case pictures of everyday objects and scenery) with the artistic style of 
arbitrary images (in our case an existing painting). The result is an artistic 
representation, a “painting”, with the subject of the first image and the artistic style 
of the second (see Table B3 in Appendix B for these 10 generated images). 
We associate each image with one of two possible artist names. To create 
names that are immediately recognizable as male and female but that are neutral 
with respect to race or country of origin, we choose the ten most common last names 
in the U.S. from the 2000 census and combine them with the ten most popular given 
names for male and female babies born between 1980 and 1989 taken from the 
Social Security Administration.15 
Similar to Experiment #1, we run OLS regressions of the artistic 
appreciation score on the name of the artist, Female Name, which is equal to one if 
the name is female, respondent characteristics, painting fixed effects and family 
background controls and state fixed effects. Table 13 presents our regression 
results. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. 
 
< Insert Table 13 about here > 
 
Panel A of Table 13 indicates that female artists’ names are on average 
 
15 The last names come from 
http://www.census.gov/topics/population/genealogy/data/2000_surnames.html. We skip three 
names of Hispanic origin to keep the names as neutral as possible. The first names come from 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/names1980s.html. 




unrelated to respondents’ appreciation. In general, fewer respondent characteristics 
are significantly related to their appreciation and fewer interaction terms are 
significant. One reason may be that because we have fewer questions about the 
paintings, respondents pay less attention to the artworks. It is also possible that the 
artificially generated paintings lack artistic “depth”. Finally, the gender of the artist 
may be less salient in this experiment than it is in Experiment #1 because we do not 
ask a question related to the artist. If participants focus only on rating the painting, 
they may overlook the artist’s name. 
Nevertheless, we still observe that female names are associated with lower 
scores for affluent individuals. This result is even stronger in Panel B where we 
restrict our analysis to individuals who indicate they visit an art gallery or exhibition 
at least a few times a year. The magnitude of the discount (a score reduction of 
0.32) for affluent individuals in Panel B represents a 6% gender discount, which 
can be considered economically significant. As with Experiment #1, the results of 
Experiment #2 provide suggestive evidence that participants who are more likely 
to represent typical art auction participants may value art by women less. 
VII. Conclusion 
In her landmark 1971 article, Nochlin (1971) famously asks: “Why Have There 
Been No Great Women Artists?” She argues that the answer lies in the nature of 
social institutions, rather than in the nature of individual genius or the lack thereof. 
Our paper is the first to provide empirical evidence consistent with her argument 
by showing that gender culture may be a source of pricing bias. By focusing on the 
secondary art market, where artists themselves play no active role, especially once 
they have died, we isolate a role of social institutions that is distinct from the 
process of art production. 
Consistent with gender culture being a source of pricing bias, we find that 




there is a substantial discount in art auction prices for paintings by female artists. 
This discount is not fully accounted for by the size, marking, style or medium of 
the paintings, the age of the painter or the topic. In fact, topics commonly associated 
with the production by female artists command a price premium, not a discount. 
The gender discount varies over time and across countries, and correlates with 
cultural factors related to gender inequality (such as the percentage of women in 
parliament in the country and year of the auction)—evidence that is difficult to 
reconcile with arguments about the nature of genius or “genetic” explanations. 
While our evidence suggests that the gender discount may decrease over 
time as gender equality increases, the impact of historic social institutions on 
woman’s participation in the art market are likely to be long-lasting. As Nochlin 
(1971) writes:  
“And while great achievement is rare and difficult at best, it is still rarer and 
more difficult if, while you work, you must at the same time wrestle with inner 
demons of self-doubt and guilt and outer monsters of ridicule or patronizing 
encouragement, neither of which have any specific connection with the 
quality of the art work as such.” 
 
While gender inequality is a serious policy concern, it is often challenging 
to prove that economic outcomes for women can be a product of culture and 
institutions. By applying one of the most fundamental laws of economics, the “law 
of one price” to the art market, we highlight the importance of culture as a source 
of pricing biases and the importance of both continuing to eliminate institutional 
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Estimating the probability that a painting was created by a woman 
 
We use a naïve Bayesian classifier with a “bag of words” approach to estimate the probability that 
a painting was created by a female artist given the words in the title of the painting. We estimate 




        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑔 = {𝐹, 𝑀}, 
where: 
• 𝑔𝑖  is the gender of the artist of the painting 𝑖, 
• 𝐰𝑖is the vector of the words in the title of painting 𝑖, 
• 𝑃(𝑔𝑖|𝐰𝑖) is the probability that the artist of the painting 𝑖 belongs to the gender 𝑔 given 
the words of the title of painting 𝑖, 
• 𝑃(𝑔𝑖) is the prior (unconditional) probability that the artist of the painting 𝑖 belongs to 
the gender 𝑔; Here we assume an unconditional probability of 50%, and 
• 𝑃(𝐰𝑖) is scaling factor and represents the probability of encountering this particular title 
and is simply calculated as: 
𝑃(𝐰𝑖) = 𝑃(𝐰𝑖|𝐹𝑖) ∙ 𝑃(𝐹𝑖) + 𝑃(𝐰𝑖|𝑀𝑖) ∙ 𝑃(𝑀𝑖). 
 
An additional assumption of naïve Bayes classifiers is the conditional independence of features. 
Under this assumption the conditional probability of observing a given vector of words is simply 
the product of the conditional probabilities of the individual words 




The individual conditional probability of observing a specific word given the gender of the artist 







• 𝑁𝑤𝑘,𝑔𝑖  is the number of times the word 𝑘 appears in the titles of paintings of artists with 
gender 𝑖, 
• 𝑁𝑔𝑖  is the total number of words in titles of paintings of artists with gender 𝑖, and 
• the +1 and +2 address the issue of estimating a non-zero conditional probability for a 
word that has never been used by a female artist. 
When applied to text classification this model is usually implemented with a “bag of words” 
approach. This states that the words used for the classification should be 
• Salient: The words are important and meaningful with respect to the problem domain. 
• Discriminatory: The selected words bear enough information to distinguish well between 
the classes (gender). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3746124
 
 47 
Accordingly, we drop from our analysis punctuation, articles and prepositions (see below for the 
detailed steps). We also reduce all the numbers to a common “word” (“Landscape n. 35” and 
“Landscape n. 43” are considered equal). Finally, while in this model the sequence of words is not 
relevant, we address the issue that in this particular domain the sequences “Still Life” and “Self 
Portrait” (and their equivalent in different languages) have a very specific meaning. So, in our 
model we consider these expressions as a single word. 
 
To increase the salience of our analysis we drop multiple occurrences of the same words in a given 
title and we only consider words that occur at least 1,000 times in our sample. The final result of 
our model is the estimated conditional probability that a given painting has been created by a 
female artist, given the words in the title. 
 
In the estimation of our naïve Bayes classifier of topics we follow these steps: 
1. Start from the text strings of the titles. 
2. Capitalize the strings (Portrait = portrait). 
3. Clean for leading spaces, trailing spaces and spaces between words. 
4. Eliminate the following: / D’ L’ N. No. 
5. Drop punctuation. 
6. Transform all the numbers in 0. The idea is that n. 37 and n. 35 convey similar information. 
7. Do the same with ordinal numbers (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. are all substituted with the string 0th). 
8. Transform “STILL LIFE” into a single word STILLLIFE. These words clearly violate the 
unconditional independence assumption since these two words together have a very domain-
specific meaning. We do the same for the Italian, French and Spanish language equivalents (it 
is not necessary for the German language equivalents). 
9. Drop the following list of articles and prepositions: "THE IN OF WITH A AND DE ON LA 
AT LE BY AU ET LES AN DU EN TO SUR UN ST VON DER OFF FOR MIT CON 
FROM DANS AUX DES UNE SOUS UND DEL AUF VOR PAR DEM NEL SUL". 
10. Drop all the words with length shorter than 3 characters. 
11. Drop multiple instances of the same word in a single title. 
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Appendix B: Inputs into experiments 
Table B1. Summary statistics for experimental populations 
  
Experiment #1 
Can you guess? 
Experiment #2 
What's in a name? 
Chi-2 p-value 
No. of participants 880 1,823   
Gender         
Female 51.7% 51.0%   
Male 48.3% 49.0% 0.113 0.737 
Age         
18 - 29 20.8% 20.2%   
30 - 44 26.9% 26.3%   
45 - 59 28.3% 28.3%   
60 + 24.0% 25.2% 0.516 0.915 
Education         
Less than high school degree 0.8% 2.0%   
High school degree 9.4% 9.5%   
Some college but no degree 25.1% 22.9%   
Associate degree 10.5% 9.8%   
Bachelor degree 29.5% 31.9%   
Graduate degree 24.7% 23.9% 8.180 0.147 
Income         
$0 to $9,999 6.8% 8.0%   
$10,000 to $24,999 11.4% 10.4%   
$25,000 to $49,999 19.8% 20.6%   
$50,000 to $74,999 18.4% 17.6%   
$75,000 to $99,999 14.5% 15.0%   
$100,000 to $124,999 11.6% 9.8%   
$125,000 to $149,999 6.3% 5.2%   
$150,000 to $174,999 3.3% 3.9%   
$175,000 to $199,999 2.0% 2.8%   
$200,000 and higher 5.9% 6.7% 7.639 0.571 
Visits to museums         
Rarely or never 58.2% 56.4%   
A few times a year 38.1% 40.2%   
Once a month or more 3.8% 3.4% 1.173 0.556 
Region         
East North Central 15.1% 16.0%   
East South Central 3.8% 4.7%   
Middle Atlantic 12.4% 13.2%   
Mountain 6.8% 8.0%   
New England 5.9% 6.5%   
Pacific 19.8% 18.6%   
South Atlantic 16.3% 15.6%   
West North Central 8.4% 7.1%   
West South Central 9.5% 8.8% 5.216 0.734 
Notes: The table reports the demographic and socio-economic distribution of the participants with complete income 
data in our two experiments. Gender, age, region, and income are supplied by SurveyMonkey. Education, visits to 
museums, state, and family background are self-reported. We also provide a Chi-2 test against the null hypothesis that 
the two samples share the same distribution.  
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Table B2. Images for Experiment #1 “Can you guess?” 
Painting 1 
David Bierk, After Gustave Courbet; The 
Love Valley 
(1/3/2013 - Heffel Fine Art) 
 
Painting 2 
Maud Lewis, Harbour; Nova Scotia 
(1/3/2013 - Heffel Fine Art) 
 
Painting 3 
Benny Andrews, The Pride of Flesh 
(1/8/2013 - Christie’s) 
 
Painting 4 
Cheryl Laemmle, Bullocks Oriole; from 
American Decoy Series 
(1/8/2013 - Christie’s) 
 
Painting 5 
Nikolai Kozlenko, Still Life with Fruit 




Oliver Clare, Still life of fruit 
(1/10/2013 - George Kidner Fine Art) 
 
 




John Alexander, Birds in Love 
(1/12/2013 - Brunk Auctions) 
 
Painting 8 
Joyce Wahl Treiman, Ruins & Visions 
(1/12/2013 - Clark Cierlak Fine Arts) 
 
Painting 9 
Betty M Bowes, Quiet Harbor 




Marie Lucie Nessi-Valtat, Vase de fleurs au 
pichet vert 
(1/13/2013 - Eric Pillon Enchères) 
 
Notes: This table shows the ten paintings used in our “Can you guess?” experiment. To keep our selection as neutral 
as possible, we choose the first paintings in our sample auctioned at the beginning of 2013. We impose the following 
restrictions on the selection: a) Five paintings from male and five from female painters; b) Only one painting per artist; 
c) Realized auction price is below US $100,000 (we want relatively unknown paintings); d) Availability of an 
electronic image with sufficient resolution. 
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Table B3. Generated images for Experiment #2 “What’s in a name?” 














Cubo-futurist rendering of Trotsky, 








Rousse, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec 
 
 











Fabrizio Acciaro, Untitled 
 
 
Sarah / David Jones 







Patrick Gunderson, Composition #53 
 




Girl with mandolin, Pablo Picasso 
 
 




Geoff Hands, Cornish Coast 
 
 




Grass, Dheeraj Kattula 
 
 








Heather / Joseph Taylor 
Notes: This table shows the artificially generated pictures used in our second experiment. The first column contains the picture 
used as the “subject” of our final image, while the second contains the picture that provided the “visual style”. The third column 
shows the final image obtained through combining subject and visual style with the algorithm developed in Gatys et al. (2015). 
The last column contains the male/female names we paired with the image. We generated the names using the ten most common 
last names in the US from the 2000 census and the ten most popular given names for male and female babies born during 1980 – 
1989 from the US Social Security Administration. Hyperlinks in the table redirect to the original images.   
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Figure 1. Kernel densities of estimated probability that a painting was created by a female 
artist given the words in the title 
 
Notes: The graph shows the kernel density for the estimated conditional probability that a given painting has been 
created by a female artist given the words of the title for the subsamples of paintings by male and female artists. 
Details on the estimation of the conditional probability are given in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of artists by gender within subsamples built on the estimated 
probability of a painting being created by a female artist 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the percentage of paintings created by male and female artists in five subsamples of our 
dataset based on the predicted probability that the painting has been created by a woman conditional on the words of 
the title, Pr (Female|Title). This probability is estimnated with a naïve Bayesian classifier with a “bag of words” 
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Figure 3. Estimated marginal effect of cultural proxy variables on the gender price gap  
 
  
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effect of a ±1 standard deviation change in the level of of our culture proxy 

































Mean Culture proxy - 1 SD Mean Culture proxy Mean Culture proxy + 1 SD
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Figure 4. Estimated probability that female and male artists sell abroad 
 
  
Notes: The graph shows the estimated probability that female and male artists sell their paintings outside their home 
country in different periods of time. 
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Figure 5. Repeated-sales price indices for paintings by female and male artists 
 
Panel A – Sample from from Korteweg et al. (2016) 
 
 
Panel B – Our Sample 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the monthly values of price indices for a subsample of paintings by male and female artists 
with repeat sales. Panel A uses data on repeat sales from Korteweg et al. (2016). The sample consists of 63,622 
transactions involving 30,655 individual paintings from 8,449 artists (7,908 male and 541 female). Panel B uses data 
from our sample with individual paintings identified based on title and author. The sample consists of 576,227 
transactions involving 179,660 paintings from 27,717 individual artists (25,022 male and 2,695 female). The 
construction of the index follows Bailey et al. (1963). 
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Table 1. Variable description 
Panel A. Regression variables 
Deceased Dummy variable equal to one when the artist is deceased at the time of the auction sale. 
Female Painter Dummy variable equal to one when the artist is female, and zero if male. 
  
Gender Gap (%) The discount for paintings by female artists relative to the average sales price of male artists. 
  
Log(Age) Natural logarithm of the age of the artist at the time of the auction sale in years. The variable is 
calculated regardless of whether the artist is dead or alive at the time of the auction sale. 
Log(GDP) Natural logarithm of per capita GDP in constant dollars from the World Bank (Code: 
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD). 
Log(Surface) Natural logarithm of the surface of the painting measured in squared millimetres. 
Marked Dummy variable that denotes whether the painting is signed or otherwise marked. 
Medium Synthetic classification of the medium of the painting. Paintings are classified as: Acrylic on Canvas, Oil 
on Board, Oil on Canvas, Oil on Panel, Oil on Paper, Mixed Media, and Tempera. 
Pr (Female|Title) The probability of the painting having been produced by a female artist (given the words in the title) 
estimated with a naïve Bayesian classifier with a “bag of words” approach. See Appendix A. 
Price Sale price of the painting in 2016 US$. In regression frameworks we consider the natural logarithm of 
this quantity labelled as Log (Price). 
Style Synthetic classification of the artistic style of the painter. Artists are classified as: 19th Century 
European, American, Asian, Impressionist and Modern, Latin American, Post-War and Contemporary, 
and Other. 
Panel B. Proxies for gender culture 
% of Women in 
Parliament 
From World Bank Data. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) (Code: 
SG.GEN.PARL.ZS), defined as the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held 
by women. Available for 1990 and with continuity from 1997. The indicator is decreasing in inequality. 
Labor Force 
Participation Ratio 
From World Bank Data. Calculated as the ratio between female (Code: SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS) and male 
(Code: SL.TLF.CACT.MA.ZS) labor force participation (population age 15+, modelled ILO estimates). 
Available from 1990. The indicator is decreasing in inequality. 
Tertiary Education 
Enrolment Ratio 
From World Bank Data. Formally known as the “Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, gender parity index 
(GPI)” (Code: SE.ENR.TERT.FM.ZS). Ratio of female gross enrolment ratio for tertiary education to 
male gross enrolment ratio. It is calculated by dividing the female value for the indicator by the male 
value for the indicator. A value equal to 1 indicates parity between females and males. In general, a 
value less than 1 indicates disparity in favor of males and a value greater than 1 indicates disparity in 
favor of females. Available from 1971. The indicator is decreasing in inequality. 
UN Gender 
Inequality Index 
A composite measure reflecting inequality in achievements between women and men in three 
dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labour market. Available for the years 1995, 
2000, 2005, 2010, and yearly from 2013. We use linear interpolation between the available years. The 
index is scaled between 0 and 1, and is increasing in inequality. For sake of comparability with other 
results we reformulate the index as one minus the original value in order to obtain an indicator 
decreasing in inequality. 
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WEF Gender Gap 
Index 
This index is calculated yearly by the World Economic Forum and ranks countries according to how 
well they are leveraging their female talent pool, based on economic, educational, health-based and 
political indicators. The index is calculated yearly from 2006 for a large sample of countries. For a 
smaller subsample data is available from 2000. The index is decreasing in inequality. 
 
Panel C. Variables in experiments 
Affluent Household income of US $100,000 or more. 
Art Expert Self-reports visiting a museum or art gallery at least a “few times a year”. 
College Educated Self-reported attainment of an associate degree or higher.  
Family Background A series of five dummy variables set equal to one if at least one of the parents of the respondent was 
born in 1) Asia, 2) Africa (including the Middle East), 3) Latin America (including Central America and 
the Carribean), 4) Europe, and 5) Oceania. 
Female Guess Respondent guess about the gender of the artist (Experiment #2). 
Female Name Painting associated with a female artist name (Experiment #1). 
Guessed Country A series of six dummy variables set equal to one if the respondent in Experiment #1 guessed  that the 
painter was born in 1) Asia, 2) Africa (including the Middle East) , 3) Latin America (including Central 
America and the Carribean), 4) North America, 5) Europe, and 6) Oceania. 
Guessed Period A series of three dummy variables set equal to one if the respondent in Experiment #1 guessed that the 
painging was created 1) Before 1850, 2) Between 1850 and 1945, 3) After 1945. 
Male Gender of the respondent. 
Mature Age of 45 years or more. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for auction data 











N. of Transactions 1,898,849 141,149 1,757,700 
  
% of Mega Transactions 0.62% 0.40% 0.64%   
Price 48,901 29,235 50,480 -21246*** -42.1% 
 (719,946) (293,789) (743,627) (1992)  
Price (excluding  22,467 18,382 22,796 -4414*** -19.4% 
Mega Transactions) (73,060) (64,328) (73,708) (203)  
Log(Price) 8.546 8.323 8.564 -0.242***  
 (1.616) (1.567) (1.618) (0.004)  
Surface (m2) 0.502 0.534 0.499 0.035***  
 (0.612) (0.680) (0.606) (0.002)  
Marked 0.75 0.71 0.75 -0.05***  
 (0.433) (0.455) (0.431) (0.001)  
Age 103.659 98.459 104.077 -5.618***  
 (29.044) (30.118) (28.915) (0.080)  
Deceased 0.749 0.655 0.756 -0.101***  
 (0.434) (0.475) (0.429) (0.001)  
Prob (Female|Title) 0.463 0.530 0.457 0.073***  
 (0.172) (0.168) (0.171) (0.000)  
Panel B: Gender Culture Variables 
 Mean St. Dev. 
Percentiles 
 10 50 90 
UN Gender Inequality Index 0.210 0.143 0.067 0.165 0.431 
WEF Gender Gap Index 0.713 0.056 0.643 0.713 0.783 
% of Women in Parliament 23.532 10.958 9.800 22.300 38.700 
Tertiary Education Enrolment Ratio 1.130 0.529 0.696 1.101 1.435 
Labor Participation Ratio 0.725 0.121 0.558 0.753 0.853 
Notes: Our sample consists of Blouin Art Sales Index (BASI) auction sales data between 1970 to 2016 involving 
paintings created by all artists born after 1850 for whom we can identify the gender of the artist. Panel A reports mean 
values (and standard deviations in parentheses) for characteristics of the paintings in our data set. Statistics are 
calculated both for the total sample and for the subsamples of transactions involving male and female artists. The table 
also provides a t-test for the difference between the two subsamples (standard errors in parentheses). The gender gap 
in % is calculated relative to the mean painting price for men. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for our gender 
culture proxy variables. Table 1 provides the variable definitions. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  




Table 3. Gender discount in time and space 
Panel A: Gender Price Gap by Sub Period 



















1970 - 1979 92,075 4.03% -10,213*** -39.1%  0.14% -7,895*** -33.1% 
   (1,536)    (1,026)  
1980 - 1989 260,582 5.73% -16,202*** -39.0%  0.45% -4,470*** -17.3% 
   (4,401)    (640)  
1990 - 1999 410,380 6.76% -18,468*** -50.3%  0.41% -6,500*** -31.6% 
   (3,204)    (409)  
2000 - 2009 648,989 8.13% -19,861*** -43.0%  0.60% -4,782*** -21.9% 
   (2,671)    (323)  
2010 - 2016 486,823 8.62% -35,125*** -45.1%  1.00% -2,027*** -8.4% 
   (5,565)    (418)  
Panel B: Gender Price Gap by Geographic Area of Auction 
Africa 19,567 12.83% 24,333*** 221.7%  0.09% 13,700*** 127.5% 
   (1,703)    (832)  
Asia 28,086 9.65% 7287* 12.8%  0.66% 1671 3.6% 
   (3,949)    (2,020)  
Cont. Europe 1,004,575 5.71% -3,324*** -19.3%  0.11% -2,423*** -17.3% 
   (909)    (200)  
North America 436,832 9.22% -63,252*** -56.3%  1.41% -10,005*** -28.8% 
   (6,925)    (513)  
Oceania 83,900 14.02% -8,305*** -44.6%  0.11% -6,468*** -38.8% 
   (748)    (480)  
South America 14,462 5.66% -440 -4.2%  0.03% -2,962*** -29.4% 
   (1,381)    (912)  
United Kingdom 311,427 8.27% -49,333*** -56.9%  1.34% -12,433*** -34.0% 
      (4,784)       (653)   
 
Notes: The table reports the number of transactions, the percentage of transactions involving female artists and the 
average gender discount (labelled Gap for brevity) for different sub-periods (Panel A) as well as the different 
geographical regions of auction (Panel B). The gender discount is calculated as the difference between the average 
sale price (in 2016 US$) of paintings of female and male artists. The gender discount in percent is the discount relative 
to the average sales price of male artists. The standard errors for the t-test for the hypothesis that the discount is 0 are 
given in parentheses. We conduct the analysis both including and excluding transactions with prices above one million 
(mega transactions) of 2016 US$. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Among frequent title words, percent least and most used by female artists 
 
Low use by female artists   High use by female artists 
Word 
% of uses by 
female artists 
 Word 
% of uses by 
female artists 
CATTLE 1.549%  ROSES 15.266% 
DUTCH 1.626%  FLOWERS 14.667% 
WOODED 1.869%  STILLIFE 12.919% 
VUE 2.304%  VASE 12.352% 
SAILING 2.360%  WHITE 11.417% 
RIVER 2.392%  BLUE 10.811% 
PEASANT 2.485%  GARDEN 10.484% 
BORD 2.506%  UNTITLED 10.240% 
HIS 2.522%  BOUQUET 10.220% 
SHEEP 2.564%  RED 10.158% 
PAYSAGE 2.654%  FRUIT 9.653% 
COWS 2.743%  GIRL 9.387% 
SEASCAPE 2.845%  TABLE 9.217% 
FIGURES 3.042%  SPRING 8.299% 
PORT 3.142%  COUNTRY 8.286% 
SAINT 3.151%  NEW 8.188% 
COAST 3.158%  JEUNE 8.109% 
NEAR 3.214%  PARK 8.086% 
STREAM 3.289%  HOUSE 8.010% 
LANDSCAPE 3.462%  BLACK 8.007% 
MAN 3.639%  CHILD 7.528% 
VILLAGE 3.658%  SUMMER 7.512% 
PARIS 3.777%  BEACH 7.452% 
CANAL 3.810%  CHILDREN 7.429% 
VIEW 3.863%   SEATED 7.377% 
 
Notes: The table shows the 50 words in the 100 most frequently used words in painting titles with the highest and 
lowest uses by female artists. The left column reports the 25 words that are used least frequently by female artists. 
The right column reports the 25 words that are used most frequently by female artists. The percentages are the 
percentages of paintings with a given word in the title belonging to female artists. 
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Table 5. Art prices and artist’s gender 
  Full Sample   
Excluding Mega 
Transactions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Female Painter -0.270***  -0.309*** -0.212*** -0.100***  -0.198*** -0.099*** 
 (-11.662) 
 










(23.398) (26.813) (23.454) (21.177) 
 
(22.623) (20.461) 
Log(Surface)    0.386*** 0.256***  0.359*** 0.251*** 
 




Marked    -0.520*** -0.040***  -0.469*** -0.038*** 
 




Log(Age)    1.037*** 0.784***  0.974*** 0.770*** 
 




Deceased    0.248*** 0.115***  0.231*** 0.112*** 
 




Year, Country FE Y Y Y Y N  Y N 
Style, Medium FE N N N Y Y  Y Y 
Auction FE N N N N Y  N Y 
N 1,898,849 1,898,849 1,898,849 1,898,849 1,890,754  1,887,112 1,878,979 
adj. R-sq 0.104 0.106 0.108 0.257 0.650   0.245 0.624 
Only painters with at least 20 sales 
Female Painter -0.135**   -0.181*** -0.117** -0.039   -0.104* -0.037 
 (-2.129) 
 
(-2.855) (-2.123) (-1.350) 
 
(-1.953) (-1.295) 
Only deceased painters 
Female Painter -0.229***   -0.277*** -0.211*** -0.084***   -0.197*** -0.084*** 
 (-8.843) 
 
(-10.750) (-9.742) (-12.268) 
 
(-9.146) (-12.353) 
Notes: The table reports results for the OLS estimation of a model where the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale 
price is regressed on a gender dummy and a series of control variables detailed in Table 1. In different specifications 
we introduce style, medium, year, country, and auction fixed effects. We repeat the analysis both including and 
excluding transactions with auction sales prices above one million 2016 US$ (mega transactions). The last two sections 
report the main coefficients of interest re-estimated on the subsample of artists for whom we have at least 20 
transactions in our sample and on the subsample of artists who were deceased at the moment of the sale. All standard 
errors are clustered at the country-year-gender level. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Gender culture and gender discount in art prices 
















Period Covered 1995 - 2016 2000 - 2016 1990 - 2016 1970 - 2016 1990 - 2016 
Female Painter 1.997*** -0.135 1.066*** 0.497** 1.545*** 
 (8.058) (-0.438) (4.824) (2.202) (7.520) 
Pr(Female|Title) -0.493 -2.355*** -0.113 -0.403 -0.017 
 (-1.416) (-3.801) (-0.316) (-1.092) (-0.055) 
Female x Culture Proxy 1.721*** 2.734*** 0.016*** 0.068 1.061*** 
 (10.749) (7.317) (15.517) (1.500) (5.947) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Culture Proxy -0.911*** 4.907*** 0.001 0.213*** 1.966*** 
 (-3.173) (6.475) (0.634) (2.648) (6.288) 
Female x Log (GDP) -0.343*** -0.196*** -0.157*** -0.075*** -0.245*** 
 (-12.344) (-8.300) (-7.607) (-3.632) (-10.676) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Log (GDP) 0.155*** -0.074 0.045 0.056 -0.104*** 
 (3.462) (-1.543) (1.368) (1.596) (-2.786) 
Log(Surface) 0.407*** 0.425*** 0.410*** 0.378*** 0.400*** 
 (71.062) (65.610) (70.848) (57.465) (73.838) 
Marked -0.601*** -0.697*** -0.615*** -0.333*** -0.564*** 
 (-8.170) (-7.872) (-8.175) (-5.955) (-8.109) 
Log(Age) 1.090*** 1.082*** 1.093*** 1.110*** 1.082*** 
 (45.100) (37.544) (43.829) (44.015) (48.203) 
Deceased 0.255*** 0.266*** 0.252*** 0.248*** 0.249*** 
 (13.770) (11.256) (13.053) (13.556) (14.834) 
Country-Year, Style, Medium FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,366,038 980,373 1,305,075 1,333,915 1,545,945 
adj. R-sq 0.262 0.274 0.271 0.291 0.272 
Only painters with at least 20 sales 
Female x Culture Proxy 1.225*** 3.011*** 0.017*** 0.150*** 1.499*** 
 (5.009) (6.254) (12.410) (2.616) (6.997) 
Only deceased painters 
Female x Culture Proxy 1.853*** 3.744*** 0.018*** 0.010 1.754*** 
 (10.313) (9.163) (15.042) (0.194) (8.637) 
Gender Effect with Demeaned Interactions 
Female Artist -0.177*** -0.213*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.217*** 
 (-13.036) (-14.953) (-19.182) (-15.924) (-19.148) 
Notes: The table reports results for the OLS estimation of the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price on a 
gender dummy, a country/year-level proxy for gender culture, and their interaction. We control for style and 
medium of the painting, and a series of control variables detailed in Table 1. We also control for country-year of the 
transaction. The next two sections report the main coefficient of interest re-estimated on the subsample of artists for 
whom we have at least 20 transactions in our sample and on the subsample of artists who were deceased at the 
moment of the sale. Finally, we report the value of the gender coefficient from an estimation of our models where all 
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the interaction variables are demeaned within our sample, thus making the gender discount comparable in size 
across models.  All standard errors are clustered at the country-year-gender level. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Gender culture and gender discount with artist and painting fixed effects 






























Period Covered 1995 - 2016 2000 - 2016 1990 - 2016 1970 - 2016 1990 - 2016 1995 - 2016 2000 - 2016 1990 - 2016 1970 - 2016 1990 - 2016 
Pr(Female|Title) -0.307 -0.937*** -0.396* -1.483*** -0.618***      
 (-1.415) (-2.695) (-1.875) (-5.997) (-3.348)      
Female x Culture Proxy 0.269* 0.603*** 0.005*** 0.172*** 0.449*** 0.305 0.111 0.009*** 0.200*** 0.467 
 (1.804) (3.193) (4.938) (5.246) (3.649) (0.884) (0.220) (3.853) (2.702) (1.523) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Culture Proxy 0.580*** 1.585*** 0.006*** 0.325*** 0.527*** 1.617*** 3.894*** 0.010** 0.167 1.946*** 
 (3.597) (4.353) (4.735) (7.704) (3.121) (3.231) (3.835) (2.157) (1.618) (3.328) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.028 0.023 0.043* 0.065** 0.031 0.056 0.047 0.068 0.077 0.083 
 (0.972) (0.991) (1.906) (2.502) (1.237) (0.988) (1.069) (1.499) (1.208) (1.579) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Log (GDP) -0.009 -0.014 0.031 0.116*** 0.028 0.261** 0.255** 0.300*** 0.255*** 0.112 
 (-0.335) (-0.558) (1.572) (5.229) (1.400) (2.254) (1.990) (2.652) (2.727) (0.962) 
Log(Surface) 0.514*** 0.527*** 0.516*** 0.496*** 0.511***      
 (170.078) (166.313) (171.256) (148.646) (173.585)      
Marked -0.123*** -0.135*** -0.126*** -0.029 -0.114***      
 (-5.211) (-5.402) (-5.320) (-1.566) (-4.943)      
Log(Age) 3.341*** 2.989*** 2.724*** 1.921*** 2.411*** 4.492*** 3.174*** 3.358*** 2.333*** 3.088*** 
 (25.506) (15.517) (10.679) (15.712) (15.111) (13.699) (7.418) (7.269) (10.942) (9.743) 
Deceased 0.139*** 0.145*** 0.121*** 0.052*** 0.105*** 0.127*** 0.139*** 0.123*** 0.060*** 0.091*** 
 (15.050) (11.770) (9.200) (5.626) (10.614) (7.889) (6.262) (6.984) (4.578) (6.172) 
Country-Year, Medium, Artist FE Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N 
Country-Year, Painting FE N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,349,428 964,579 1,288,523 1,319,020 1,529,151 289,934 199,170 274,904 310,788 338,774 
adj. R-sq 0.778 0.798 0.782 0.761 0.773 0.833 0.845 0.835 0.821 0.829 
Only painters with at least 20 sales 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.509*** 0.948*** 0.007*** 0.238*** 0.823*** 0.510 0.329 0.009*** 0.201*** 0.665** 
 (3.102) (4.596) (6.598) (6.708) (5.736) (1.334) (0.625) (3.917) (2.614) (2.038) 
Only deceased painters 
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Female x Culture Proxy 0.444*** 1.114*** 0.006*** 0.180*** 0.618*** 0.375 0.892 0.008*** 0.312*** 0.247 
  (2.670) (5.525) (4.784) (4.935) (3.948) (1.023) (1.573) (3.188) (3.397) (0.608) 
 
Notes: The table reports results for the OLS estimation of the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price on a country/year-level proxy for gender culture and its 
interaction with a gender dummy. The model includes artist (columns 1-5) or painting (columns 6-10) fixed effects and thus a standalone gender dummy is not 
included. We only consider artists or paintings for which we observe transactions in multiple years and/or countries. We control for style and medium of the 
painting, and a series of control variables detailed in Table 1. We also control for country-year of the transaction. The last two sections report the main coefficient 
of interest re-estimated on the subsample of artists for whom we have at least 20 transactions in our sample and on the subsample of artists who were deceased at 
the moment of the sale. All standard errors are clustered at the country-year-gender level. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
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Table 8. Accounting for liquidity and uncertainty about the quality of art by female artists 
Panel A – Accounting for Liquidity  

















Female x Culture Proxy 0.207 0.746*** 0.005*** 0.134*** 0.558*** 
 (1.383) (3.749) (4.806) (3.652) (3.980) 
Female x Liquidity -0.015* -0.021** -0.005 -0.003 -0.014 
 (-1.789) (-2.131) (-0.597) (-0.384) (-1.606) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.058* 0.050* 0.051* 0.067** 0.043* 
 (1.780) (1.931) (1.940) (2.493) (1.682) 
5-Years Liquidity 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.196 0.680*** 0.005*** 0.159*** 0.558*** 
 (1.300) (3.579) (4.782) (4.487) (4.200) 
Female x Liquidity -0.015* -0.020** -0.006 -0.005 -0.017** 
 (-1.872) (-2.134) (-0.760) (-0.707) (-2.049) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.058* 0.048* 0.052** 0.070*** 0.046* 
 (1.791) (1.888) (2.044) (2.670) (1.786) 
1970 Liquidity 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.233 0.773*** 0.005*** 0.150*** 0.526*** 
 (1.567) (3.748) (4.785) (4.341) (3.581) 
Female x Liquidity -0.010 -0.018** -0.003 0.008 -0.008 
 (-1.392) (-2.006) (-0.342) (1.356) (-0.991) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.051 0.050* 0.047* 0.049* 0.039 
 (1.563) (1.908) (1.750) (1.796) (1.507) 
Style Liquidity 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.226 0.611*** 0.005*** 0.121*** 0.472*** 
 (1.569) (3.019) (4.698) (3.360) (3.605) 
Female x Liquidity -0.007 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.002 
 (-0.872) (0.397) (0.281) (0.552) (-0.255) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.037 0.016 0.039 0.058** 0.029 
 (1.222) (0.686) (1.569) (2.100) (1.138) 
Auction House Liquidity 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.216 0.632*** 0.005*** 0.133*** 0.467*** 
 (1.475) (3.076) (4.774) (3.764) (3.475) 
Female x Liquidity -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 
 (-0.901) (-0.281) (-0.611) (0.499) (-0.694) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.031 0.016 0.037 0.054** 0.025 
 (1.074) (0.682) (1.644) (2.042) (1.010) 
 
 




[Panel A on previous page] 




Panel B - Accounting for Uncertainty about Quality 

















N. of Female Artists 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.202 0.545*** 0.005*** 0.174*** 0.430*** 
 (1.140) (2.815) (4.654) (5.260) (3.478) 
Female x N. of Female Artists (x000) -0.032 -0.098 0.055 -0.134** -0.090* 
 (-0.477) (-1.229) (0.757) (-2.510) (-1.747) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.037 0.033 0.038* 0.060** 0.036 
 (1.223) (1.338) (1.726) (2.269) (1.439) 
% of Female Artists 
Female x Culture Proxy 0.221 0.516** 0.004*** 0.136*** 0.355*** 
 (1.451) (2.489) (4.260) (4.047) (2.690) 
Female x % of Female Artists 0.323 0.132 0.284 0.455** 0.265 
 (1.620) (0.613) (1.360) (2.001) (1.634) 
Female x Log (GDP) 0.025 0.023 0.037 0.059** 0.035 
  (0.863) (1.014) (1.578) (2.247) (1.386) 
 
Notes: The table reports the key interaction coefficients for the OLS estimation of the models in columns 1-5 of Table 
7 augmented by interactions between the gender dummy and different country-year proxies for the liquidity of 
artworks by female artists (in Panel A), and interactions between a gender dummy and different country-year proxies 
for the prevalence of female artists (in Panel B). All standard errors are clustered at the country-year-gender level. The 
asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Birth country gender equality and the decision to sell abroad 
















Period Covered 1995 - 2016 2000 - 2016 1990 - 2016 1970 - 2016 1990 - 2016 
Birth Country Culture -0.786 -1.961* -0.026*** -1.417*** 1.494*** 
 (-1.188) (-1.711) (-7.184) (-7.327) (2.933) 
Log(Birth Country GDP) -0.995*** -0.919*** -0.958*** -1.402*** -1.210*** 
 (-8.343) (-6.765) (-9.414) (-11.414) (-11.668) 
Female Artist 0.121 3.082* 0.170 -0.853 0.437 
 (0.081) (1.688) (0.129) (-0.492) (0.332) 
BC Culture x Female Artist 1.484* -6.636*** -0.017*** 0.084 -3.361*** 
 (1.700) (-4.032) (-2.949) (0.341) (-4.049) 
Log(BC GDP) x Female Artist -0.130 0.164 0.018 0.075 0.205 
 (-0.767) (0.990) (0.142) (0.458) (1.357) 
Log(Age) 0.203*** 0.189*** 0.235*** 0.244*** 0.159*** 
 (3.792) (3.073) (4.357) (4.312) (3.234) 
Deceased -0.156*** -0.137*** -0.130*** -0.151*** -0.149*** 
 (-5.353) (-3.745) (-4.400) (-5.794) (-5.522) 
Log(N of Sales) 0.109*** 0.094*** 0.101*** 0.139*** 0.106*** 
 (11.057) (7.567) (10.320) (14.370) (11.154) 
Log(Surface) 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.052*** 
 (4.365) (4.079) (5.357) (7.171) (4.880) 
Marked -0.311*** -0.415*** -0.320*** -0.249*** -0.282*** 
 (-4.166) (-4.679) (-4.124) (-3.309) (-4.007) 
Pr(Female|Title) 0.286*** 0.323*** 0.338*** 0.308*** 0.282*** 
 (3.845) (3.086) (4.153) (5.160) (4.587) 
Constant 8.623*** 8.171*** 7.564*** 9.353*** 9.451*** 
 (7.290) (5.529) (6.623) (7.173) (8.918) 
Year, Style, Medium FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,324,741 942,667 1,264,366 1,312,531 1,495,496 
Pseudo R-sq 0.117 0.114 0.123 0.103 0.121 
Excess Prob(Abroad) of female artists (vs. male) for levels of home-country culture proxy 
Mean Culture proxy - 1 SD -2.33% 5.70% 2.50% 0.13% 5.06% 
Mean Culture proxy -0.08% 0.37% -0.52% 0.43% 0.29% 
Mean Culture proxy + 1 SD 2.16% -4.07% -2.80% 0.64% -4.43% 
Only painters with at least 20 sales 
HC Culture x Female Artist 0.562 -7.452*** -0.022*** 0.002 -4.256*** 
 (0.547) (-4.092) (-3.670) (0.006) (-4.721) 
Log(HC GDP) x Female Artist 0.022 0.149 0.037 0.075 0.299** 
  (0.115) (0.867) (0.291) (0.449) (1.988) 
Only deceased painters 
HC Culture x Female Artist 1.109 -4.394*** -0.012** 0.263 -3.470*** 
 (1.126) (-2.689) (-2.078) (1.079) (-4.640) 
Log(HC GDP) x Female Artist -0.095 0.042 -0.007 0.006 0.207 
  (-0.518) (0.236) (-0.051) (0.038) (1.382) 
Gender Effect with Demeaned Interactions 
Female Artist -1.238* 4.796*** 0.354** -0.072 2.573*** 
 (-1.690) (3.987) (2.351) (-0.245) (4.007) 
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Notes: The table reports the estimation results for the logit estimation of the probability an artist’s work is sold outside 
their birth country on a gender dummy, a country/year-level proxy for gender culture in the birth country, and their 
interaction. We control for the year of the transaction, style and medium of the painting and other artist and painting 
control variables. We report the marginal effect of a (±1 SD) change in the gender culture proxy on the probability of 
selling abroad for paintings by female artists (in excess over male artists). The next two sections report the main 
coefficients of interest re-estimated on the subsample of artists for whom we have at least 20 transactions in our 
sample, and on the subsample of artists who were deceased at the moment of the sale. Finally, we report the value of 
the gender coefficient from an estimation of our models where all the interaction variables are demeaned within our 
sample, thus making the gender discount comparable in size across models.  All standard errors are clustered at the 
country-year-gender level. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-
statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Table 10. Ability to guess the gender of a painter by looking at his/her work 

















Individual Paintings                 
Betty M Bowes Quiet Harbor Female 59.42% 75.83% 24.17% 24.17% -10.972 0.000 
Cheryl Laemmle 
Bullocks Oriole, from 
American Decoy Series 
Female 53.51% 61.84% 38.16% 38.16% -5.058 0.000 
Joyce Wahl Treiman Ruins & Visions Female 16.47% 71.02% 28.98% 28.98% -8.937 0.000 
Marie Lucie Nessi-
Valtat 
Vase de fleurs au pichet 
vert 
Female 71.19% 34.04% 65.96% 65.96% 6.589 0.000 
Maud Lewis Harbour; Nova Scotia Female 41.89% 69.12% 30.88% 30.88% -7.847 0.000 
Benny Andrews The Pride of Flesh Male 50.00% 48.99% 51.01% 48.99% -0.426 0.670 
David Bierk 
The Love Valley in 
Thunderstorm (after 
Gustave Courbet) 
Male 44.62% 79.49% 20.51% 79.49% 12.215 0.000 
John Alexander Birds in Love Male 61.40% 80.19% 19.81% 80.19% 12.432 0.000 
Nikolai Kozlenko Still Life with Fruit Male 81.78% 45.97% 54.03% 45.97% -1.655 0.098 
Oliver Clare Still life of fruit Male 81.78% 59.38% 40.62% 59.38% 3.994 0.000 
Grouped by Gender                 
Female Artists  Female  62.60% 37.40% 37.40% -11.838 0.000 
Male Artists  Male  62.67% 37.33% 62.67% 11.815 0.000 
Entire Sample                 
All Artists       62.63% 37.37% 49.94% -0.076 0.940 
Notes: The table reports the results of an experiment in which a sample of 1,000 individuals representative of the US 
population have been asked to guess the gender of the artists of the 10 listed paintings. The table reports the actual 
gender of the artist and the estimated probability the painting was created by a woman conditional on the words in the 
title. The table also shows the percentage of male/female guesses together with the percentage of correct guesses and 
the p-value of a test against the null hypothesis that this last quantity is different from what would result from a random 
guess. 
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Table 11. Frequency of “male” guesses and characteristics of the respondents 
By Age of the Respondent I II III IV 
 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+ 
% of Male Guesses 0.605 0.596 0.645 0.658 
Difference  -0.009 0.041* 0.053** 
  (-0.417) (1.924) (2.434) 
By Income of the 
Respondent         





% of Male Guesses 0.599 0.640 0.635 0.667 
Difference  0.041** 0.036* 0.069*** 
  (2.360) (1.712) (2.756) 










% of Male Guesses 0.602 0.609 0.636 0.657 
Difference  0.007 0.034* 0.055*** 
  (0.258) (1.844) (2.869) 








% of Male Guesses 0.619 0.637   
Difference  0.018   
  (1.237)   
By Gender of the 
Respondent         
 Female Male   
% of Male Guesses 0.627 0.625   
Difference  -0.002   
   (-0.123)     
Notes: The table reports the frequency with which groups of respondents with different characteristics in terms of age, 
income, education, art experience, and gender have answered “Male” when asked to guess the gender of the artist who 
created one of the 10 paintings listed in Table 10. The table also reports Z-stats (in parentheses) on tests on the 
difference between the different sub-groups and the group in the first column (I). The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 12. Perceived gender and artistic appreciation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Female Guess 0.185**  0.029 0.160* 0.165* 0.335*** -0.091 0.037 0.387** 0.422*** 
 (2.334)  (0.372) (1.800) (1.754) (2.993) (-0.806) (0.306) (2.339) (2.636) 
Pr(Female|Title)  2.460*** 2.447*** 2.358*** 2.790*** 2.756*** 2.258*** 2.007*** 2.523***  
  (13.171) (12.926) (10.387) (11.690) (10.537) (7.866) (6.138) (5.539)  
Affluent -0.178 -0.182 -0.181 -0.162 -0.180 -0.183 -0.181 -0.179 -0.173 -0.061 
 (-1.526) (-1.551) (-1.547) (-0.625) (-1.537) (-1.558) (-1.545) (-1.528) (-0.667) (-0.454) 
Art Expert 0.401*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.395*** 0.986*** 0.399*** 0.391*** 0.392*** 1.110*** 0.522*** 
 (3.771) (3.672) (3.675) (3.698) (3.990) (3.736) (3.658) (3.669) (4.511) (4.237) 
Male 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.070 0.697*** 0.067 0.066 0.740*** 0.341*** 
 (0.632) (0.642) (0.640) (0.629) (0.678) (2.949) (0.648) (0.637) (3.124) (2.845) 
Mature -0.055 -0.061 -0.059 -0.058 -0.058 -0.058 -0.350 -0.060 -0.272 -0.168 
 (-0.511) (-0.558) (-0.548) (-0.538) (-0.539) (-0.539) (-1.436) (-0.553) (-1.146) (-1.362) 
College Educated -0.384*** -0.388*** -0.388*** -0.386*** -0.386*** -0.397*** -0.386*** -0.768*** -0.867*** -0.449*** 
 (-3.400) (-3.427) (-3.420) (-3.405) (-3.404) (-3.497) (-3.403) (-2.939) (-3.312) (-3.533) 
Female Guess x Affluent    -0.451**     -0.431** -0.316* 
    (-2.548)     (-2.371) (-1.833) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Affluent    0.253     0.264  
    (0.652)     (0.665)  
Female Guess x Art Expert     -0.335**    -0.306* -0.299** 
     (-2.075)    (-1.921) (-1.967) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Art Expert     -0.837**    -1.066***  
     (-2.264)    (-2.857)  
Female Guess x Male      -0.638***   -0.620*** -0.649*** 
      (-4.150)   (-4.068) (-4.442) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Male      -0.700*   -0.778**  
      (-1.942)   (-2.162)  
Female Guess x Mature       0.236  0.280* 0.331** 
       (1.528)  (1.803) (2.236) 
Pr(Female|Title) x Mature       0.360  0.196  
       (0.992)  (0.547)  
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Female Guess x College Educated        -0.015 0.070 0.185 
        (-0.097) (0.449) (1.237) 
Pr(Female|Title) x College Educated        0.690* 0.804**  
        (1.778) (2.050)  
Family Background, Guessed Country 
and Period, State FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Painting FE N N N N N N N N N Y 
N 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 
adj. R-sq 0.057 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.089 0.092 0.088 0.087 0.095 0.155 
Notes: The table reports results for an OLS estimation of the effect of a female artist guess on artistic appreciation after controlling for respondent characteristics.  
In every model we also control for the guessed period of the painting and the guessed geographic origin of the artist. We also control for family background and 
state of residence of the respondent. We include painting fixed effects in column 10. All standard errors are clustered at the survey respondent level. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Associated gender and artistic appreciation 
Panel A: Entire sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female Name 0.037 0.075* 0.039 0.066 0.018 0.048 0.060 
 (1.011) (1.729) (0.772) (1.276) (0.351) (0.794) (0.723) 
Affluent -0.133 -0.064 -0.133 -0.133 -0.133 -0.133 -0.057 
 (-1.574) (-0.684) (-1.573) (-1.572) (-1.571) (-1.574) (-0.593) 
Art Expert 0.576*** 0.575*** 0.579*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.572*** 
 (7.864) (7.854) (7.114) (7.863) (7.862) (7.864) (7.022) 
Male -0.137* -0.137* -0.137* -0.107 -0.137* -0.137* -0.111 
 (-1.858) (-1.856) (-1.858) (-1.310) (-1.857) (-1.858) (-1.354) 
Mature -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.218*** -0.201*** -0.232*** 
 (-2.682) (-2.695) (-2.681) (-2.683) (-2.627) (-2.684) (-2.768) 
College Educated -0.131 -0.131 -0.131 -0.131 -0.130 -0.122 -0.138 
 (-1.553) (-1.559) (-1.553) (-1.555) (-1.550) (-1.319) (-1.491) 
Female Name x Affluent  -0.136*     -0.149* 
  (-1.716)     (-1.755) 
Female Name x Art Expert   -0.005    0.005 
   (-0.073)    (0.069) 
Female Name x Male    -0.059   -0.051 
    (-0.818)   (-0.705) 
Female Name x Mature     0.034  0.059 
     (0.469)  (0.789) 
Female Name x College Educated      -0.018 0.015 
      (-0.235) (0.190) 
Family Background Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Painting-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 18,230 18,230 18,230 18,230 18,230 18,230 18,230 
adj. R-sq. 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 
[Panel B on next page] 
  




Panel B: Only people who visit museums 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female Name 0.040 0.114* -0.030 -0.061 -0.061 -0.197* 
 (0.775) (1.818) (-0.436) (-0.841) (-0.682) (-1.823) 
Affluent 0.064 0.174 0.063 0.066 0.065 0.230* 
 (0.572) (1.455) (0.561) (0.588) (0.581) (1.888) 
Male 0.012 0.013 -0.064 0.014 0.013 -0.066 
 (0.126) (0.136) (-0.588) (0.138) (0.132) (-0.601) 
Mature -0.226** -0.228** -0.225** -0.321*** -0.226** -0.355*** 
 (-2.206) (-2.226) (-2.194) (-2.861) (-2.203) (-3.153) 
College Educated -0.238* -0.239* -0.237* -0.238* -0.306** -0.330** 
 (-1.953) (-1.962) (-1.946) (-1.957) (-2.322) (-2.506) 
Female Name  x Affluent  -0.218**    -0.324*** 
  (-2.023)    (-2.829) 
Female Name  x Male   0.153   0.163 
   (1.475)   (1.594) 
Female Name  x Mature    0.190*  0.257** 
    (1.861)  (2.437) 
Female Name  x College Educated     0.134 0.181 
     (1.235) (1.624) 
Family Background Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Painting-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 7,940 7,940 7,940 7,940 7,940 7,940 
adj. R-sq. 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.065 
Notes: The table reports results for an OLS estimation of the effect of association with a female artist name on artistic 
appreciation after controlling for respondent characteristics. Panel A analyzes the entire sample, while Panel B focuses 
on respondents who visit museums or art galleries at least a few times a year. We also control for family background 
and state of residence of the respondent. Finally, we include painting fixed effects to control for the characteristics of 
the individual works of art. All standard errors are clustered at the survey respondent level. The asterisks ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Online Appendix 1: Robustness checks 
Table OA1.1. Robustness to classifications of gender 
 

















gender in US 
artist sample 
(Year of birth) 
Restricted to 




Bocart et al. 
(2018) 
Female Painter -0.216*** -0.200 -0.661*** -0.328* 0.092 -0.196*** 
 (-4.627) (-1.459) (-4.642) (-1.797) (0.506) (-4.238) 
Pr(Female|Title) 0.388*** 0.653*** 0.341 0.119 0.116 0.450*** 
 (6.953) (5.732) (1.086) (0.623) (0.795) (10.205) 
Log(Surface) 0.386*** 0.394*** 0.426*** 0.356*** 0.492*** 0.417*** 
 (44.309) (14.247) (8.566) (9.242) (14.122) (45.234) 
Marked -0.523*** -0.479*** -0.761*** -0.834*** -0.321*** -0.585*** 
 (-26.033) (-13.991) (-8.750) (-10.577) (-5.396) (-26.675) 
Log(Age) 1.012*** 1.241*** 1.287*** 0.799** 1.122*** 1.161*** 
 (12.232) (5.637) (2.826) (2.156) (2.994) (14.574) 
Deceased 0.245*** 0.304*** 0.234 0.513 0.170 0.245*** 
 (4.675) (2.608) (1.091) (1.544) (0.879) (3.644) 
Year, Country, Style, 
Medium FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,731,343 167,505 23,262 56,803 25,122 1,298,140 
adj. R-sq 0.254 0.302 0.332 0.369 0.387 0.251 
 
Notes: The table reports results for the OLS estimation of a model where the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price 
is regressed on a gender dummy and a series of control variables detailed in Table 1. In Model 1 we exclude artists whose 
gender has been identified with ad-hoc online searches. In Model 2 we only consider artists whose gender has been 
identified with ad-hoc online searches. In Model 3 we only consider American artists whose name has a 100% gender 
specificity in the US Census Records from 1880 to 2016. In Model 4 we only consider American artists whose name has 
a 100% gender specificity in the US Census Records in the year of birth of the artist. In Model 5 we only consider artists 
whose names appear in the database “The Getty Research Institute - Union List of Artist Names Online” (Link: 
http://www.getty.edu/research/tools/vocabularies/ulan/?find=&role=&nation=&page=1) or the “Oxford Art Online - 
Grove Art Online”. The sample contains 441 individual artists (352 males and 89 females). In Model 6 we impose the 
same restrictions as in Bocart et al. (2018): Artists born after the year 1250 in Western Europe or North America and with 
transaction years after 2000 (ending in 2016 in our sample). Our restricted sample contains 47,023 individual artists 
(39,887 males and 7,136 females). Female artists account for 82,644 transactions. In all models we include style, medium, 
time, and country fixed effects and exclude transactions with auction sales prices above one million (mega transactions) 
2016 US$. All standard errors are clustered at the individual artist and auction level. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Table OA1.2. Controlling for skewness of the dependent variable 
 














Female Painter -22,772.582*** -0.100*** -0.165*** -0.220*** 
 (-3.534) (-4.397) (-4.963) (-49.764) 
Pr(Female|Title) 23,856.052** 0.165*** 0.369*** 0.423*** 
 (2.395) (7.061) (10.712) (62.024) 
Log(Surface) 38,675.795*** 0.256*** 0.285*** 0.357*** 
 (7.016) (55.746) (39.557) (283.802) 
Marked -69,826.739*** -0.040*** -0.336*** -0.430*** 
 (-6.557) (-5.810) (-24.699) (-115.869) 
Log(Age) 92,668.007*** 0.784*** 0.729*** 0.868*** 
 (4.531) (19.229) (13.064) (149.433) 
Deceased 25,986.648* 0.115*** 0.202*** 0.234*** 
 (1.664) (5.180) (6.902) (58.387) 
Constant    0.216*** 
 
   
(4.341) 
Year, Country FE Y N Y Y 
Style, Medium FE Y Y Y Y 
Auction FE N Y N N 
N 1,898,849 1,890,754 1,798,783 1,887,112 
adj. R-sq 0.016 0.646 0.204   
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates of a model where the sale price is regressed on a gender dummy and a 
series of control variables detailed in Table 1. In Model 1 the dependent variable is the inflation-adjusted sale price 
(without logarithmic adjustment). In Model 2 the dependent variable is the (natural log of) the non-inflation-adjusted 
sale price. In Model 3 the dependent variable is the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price but we only consider 
transactions with price lower than 100,000 in 2016 US$. In Model 4 we use a quantile regression model where the 
dependent variable is the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price. In all models we include style, medium, time, 
and country fixed effects and exclude transactions with auction sales prices above one million (mega transactions) 
2016 US$. All standard errors are clustered at the individual artist and auction level (except for Model 4 where we 
present robust standard errors). The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-
statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Online Appendix 2: Comparison with Bocart et al. (2018) 
In a contemporaneous paper, Bocart et al. (2018) document an overall premium for artworks 
created by women in a sample of 2,677,190 auction transactions for photography, prints and 
multiples, works on paper, paintings, design objects and sculptures from data provider Artnet AG. 
Although the focus of our paper is different than theirs, i.e., we are interested in identifying whether 
culture explains auction outcomes for female artists, while they are interested in superstar effects, 
it is, nevertheless, important to identify potential reasons why our results might differ. 
A direct comparison of our papers is complicated by the fact that Bocart et al. (2018) 
include artworks other than paintings in most regressions. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain 
data or code from the authors that would enable us to directly compare the underlying data sources 
and the analysis for paintings. Thus, we proceed by replicating the analysis as described in their 
paper as best we can. While this replication is not perfect, we believe it is still able to rule out 
coding errors as a source of the differences in results. As we show below, sample composition, 
and ensuing selection effects, seem to be the main reasons why our results differ. 
 Our first observation is, as we summarize in Table OA2.1, that Bocart et al. (2018) contains 
far fewer transactions for paintings by women and far fewer female artists than our sample does. 
The sample in Bocart et al. (2018) contains 1,165,467 transactions for paintings between 2000 and 
April 2017 by 81,847 artists born after the year 1250 in Europe or North America. While our 
sample ends in December 2016, if we impose the same sample restrictions as in Bocart et al., we 
end with more transactions (1,298,122). Of these transactions, 83,761 are for paintings by women, 
whereas Bocart et al. have only 33,064 transactions for women. If we relax the assumption that 
artists need to be born in Europe and North America and require artists to be born after 1850, i.e., 
we focus on our main sample, the number of transactions for female artists increases to 141,149 
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Table OA2.1. Sample Size Comparison 
  
Our Sample with artists 
born from 1250 
Our Sample with artists 
born from 1850 
Our Sample with 
restrictions of Bocart et 
al. (2018) 
Bocart et al. (2018) 
  Painters Transactions Painters Transactions Painters Transactions Painters Transactions 
Female 12,467 158,854 11,369 141,149 8,556 83,761 3,663 33,064 
Male 78,366 2,514,210 57,820 1,757,700 61,164 1,214,361 78,184 1,132,403 
Total 90,833 2,673,064 69,189 1,898,849 69,720 1,298,122 81,847 1,165,467 
 
Notes: The table reports size in terms of number of transactions and number of artists for (a) Our sample considering 
all artists born from 1250; (b) Our sample with artists born from 1850 (the main selection used in this paper); (c) Our 
sample after imposing the same sample restrictions as in Bocart et al. (2018): artists born from 1250 in Europe or 
North America and transaction years after 2000 (ending in 2016 in our sample); (d) The sample of Bocart et al. (2018), 
data extracted from Table 1 in their manuscript. 
 
 
In their paper, Bocart et al. (2018) document a high sample concentration for female artists: 
the top 47 artists account for 25% of the total number of sales of artworks by female artists (in our 
sample this number is 17.42%). To mitigate the effect of this concentration they implement a 
weighted average least square estimation where the weigths are the inverse of the square root of 
the number of artworks sold by each individual artist. We note that in this estimation (Table 6) 
they obtain a gender discount of 8.3%, similar in size to what we observe in our sample. 
In OLS regressions, Bocart et al. (2018) document a premium for all artworks (Table 4) 
and for paintings (Table A6, first column). When they divide their sample into style categories, 
they document a discount for Modern, but a premium for Contemporary, Post War and Old 
Masters. They also document that their premium for artworks by women seems to be primarily 
driven by artists who were born prior to the 1850s. The magnitude of the premium is much smaller 
for women born after 1950 and becomes a discount for some later generations of artists. 
The regression results in Bocart et al. (2018) together with the observation that their sample 
contains a relatively small number of transactions for female artists suggests that the premium they 
document could be driven by an underrepresentation of female artists in their sample, especially 
among painters born in the 20th century. We provide suggestive evidence that this may be the case 
in Tables OA2.3 and OA2.4. But first we show that differences in results do not stem from 
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differences in regression specifications across papers. 
In column (1) of Table OA2.2, we replicate the regression of log price on the female 
dummy for paintings in Table A6 of Bocart et al. (2018) with the same sample restrictions as in 
Bocart et al. (2018), i.e., artists born after 1250, born in Europe or North America, transaction 
years after 2000. Consistent with our previous results, we find a statistically significant discount 
for paintings by female artists. The discount is also present in column (2), where we use the same 
specification as in column (1) in our primary sample (artists born after 1850). 
 
Table OA2.2. Replication of the base model of Bocart et al. (2018) 
  
Sample restrictions of 
Bocart et al. (2018) 
Excluding artists 
born before 1850 
  (1) (2) 
Female Painter -0.153*** -0.147*** 
 (-33.759) (-30.791) 
Log(Surface) 0.308*** 0.314*** 
 (282.829) (248.649) 
Alive -0.510*** -0.455*** 
 (-164.479) (-143.287) 
Eastern Europe 0.052*** -0.002 
 (7.472) (-0.232) 
Northern Europe -0.406*** -0.423*** 
 (-42.856) (-36.591) 
Southern Europe 0.099*** 0.042*** 
 
(15.384) (5.647) 
Western Europe -0.158*** -0.203*** 
  (-33.353) (-37.447) 
Auction House FE Y Y 
N 1,298,122 1,000,468 
adj. R-sq 0.467 0.477 
 
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimates of a model where the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price is 
regressed on a gender dummy and a series of control variables used in Bocart et al. (2018). Alive is defined equal to 
one if the artist is alive at the moment of auction sale. The four regional dummies are defined based on the nationality 
of the artists with the base case equal to “North America”. In Model (1) we impose the same sample restrictions as in 
Bocart et al. (2018): Artists born after 1250 in Europe or North America and transaction years after 2000 (ending in 
2016 in our sample). In Model (2) we only consider artists born after 1850. In all models we include auction house 
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fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics are given 
in parentheses. 
 
In Table OA2.3, we use the same regression specification and sample restrictions as in 
column (1) of Table OA2.2, i.e., with the Bocart et al. (2018) sample restrictions, for different style 
subsamples. While we generally document a discount for female artists, we document a premium 
for women in a small sample of Latin American transactions. We also document a premium for 
paintings by female Old Masters, which is consistent with the findings in Bocart et al. (2018). 
In Table OA2.4, we use the same regression specification and sample restrictions for 
different cohorts of artists. While we document a discount for each cohort of artists born after 
1850, we find a premium for paintings by women for most cohorts of artists born prior to 1850. 
Our analysis suggests that the discount we document is widespread and can be considered to reflect 
the average outcome experienced by women’s art in the secondary market since few female artists 
were born prior to 1850. However, art by selected samples of female artists may experience a 
premium relative to art by similar male artists. Thus, our sample seems more suited for analyzing 
the role of culture in the art market. The sample by Bocart et al. (2018) may be more suited for 
analyzing the presence of superstar effects. 
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Table OA2.3. Gender discount by style 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





Latin American Old Masters Other 
Post-war and 
Contemporary 
Female Painter -0.034*** -0.145*** -0.665*** -0.128*** 0.410*** 0.089** -0.061*** -0.230*** 
 (-3.321) (-12.581) (-2.842) (-9.548) (3.525) (2.510) (-8.884) (-20.313) 
Log(Surface) 0.303*** 0.260*** 0.640*** 0.288*** 0.338*** 0.293*** 0.259*** 0.350*** 
 (164.616) (74.342) (20.714) (84.959) (9.062) (69.778) (117.235) (141.717) 
Alive -0.753*** -0.518*** -0.567*** -0.565*** -0.037 -1.070*** -0.478*** -0.523*** 
 (-11.774) (-46.685) (-7.511) (-44.218) (-0.363) (-2.596) (-94.048) (-91.414) 
Eastern Europe 0.418*** 0.948*** 4.022*** 0.195*** -0.266 0.164 0.578*** -0.599*** 
 (14.652) (14.270) (10.039) (4.027) (-1.094) (1.309) (39.130) (-34.208) 
Northern Europe -0.248*** -1.087*** 0.513 -0.521***  0.216* 0.062*** -0.597*** 
 (-8.633) (-9.141) (1.453) (-9.100) 
 
(1.873) (2.752) (-25.736) 
Southern Europe 0.220*** -0.499*** 1.025*** 0.472*** -0.132 0.658*** 0.272*** -0.396*** 
 (7.904) (-2.945) (2.601) (9.555) (-0.884) (5.961) (15.361) (-30.904) 
Western Europe -0.139*** -0.143*** 1.100*** 0.055 0.360*** 0.385*** 0.189*** -0.438*** 
 (-5.199) (-3.938) (4.133) (1.150) (2.877) (3.496) (15.291) (-40.446) 
Auction House FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 348,368 139,839 1,887 209,223 1,208 72,447 290,600 233,972 
adj. R-sq 0.399 0.400 0.526 0.524 0.557 0.400 0.446 0.568 
 
Notes: The table reports results for the OLS estimation of a model where the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price is regressed on a gender dummy and a 
series of control variables used in Bocart et al. (2018). Alive is defined equal to one if the artist is alive at the moment of sale. The four regional dummies are 
defined based on the nationality of the artists with the base case equal to “North America”. The model is estimated separately for the eight styles represented in our 
sample. We impose the same sample restrictions as in Bocart et al. (2018): artists born after 1250 in Europe or North America, and transaction years after 2000 
(ending in 2016 in our sample). In all models we include auction house fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Table OA2.4. Gender discount by artist cohort 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  <1700 <1800 <1825 <1850 <1875 <1900 <1925 <1950 <1975 <2001 
Female Painter 0.299*** -0.001 0.158*** 0.053*** -0.100*** -0.120*** -0.068*** -0.193*** -0.274*** -0.306*** 
 (5.230) (-0.033) (5.573) (2.864) (-8.782) (-12.984) (-7.394) (-16.615) (-20.208) (-6.688) 
Log(Surface) 0.244*** 0.358*** 0.310*** 0.319*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.374*** 0.331*** 0.352*** 0.320*** 
 (47.606) (63.824) (78.799) (96.366) (120.886) (112.536) (140.363) (124.787) (89.787) (20.241) 
Alive      -0.821*** -0.156*** -0.321*** -0.985*** -1.099*** 
 
     
(-17.179) (-22.004) (-50.303) (-42.091) (-4.057) 
Eastern Europe 0.877** 0.166** 0.832*** 0.722*** 0.496*** 0.239*** -0.435*** -0.480*** -0.553*** -1.070*** 
 (2.131) (2.222) (22.954) (31.386) (30.631) (17.468) (-26.096) (-23.126) (-20.146) (-11.108) 
Northern Europe 0.799** -0.082 -0.496*** -0.298*** -0.173*** -0.527*** -0.458*** -0.477*** -0.450*** -0.608*** 
 (1.960) (-1.473) (-15.615) (-12.638) (-8.945) (-19.500) (-18.545) (-17.170) (-9.711) (-3.463) 
Southern Europe 1.364*** 0.418*** -0.092*** 0.303*** 0.278*** 0.564*** -0.152*** -0.410*** -0.263*** -0.811*** 
 (3.374) (10.236) (-2.884) (14.771) (16.613) (34.188) (-10.254) (-25.886) (-12.399) (-5.166) 
Western Europe 1.252*** -0.248*** -0.395*** -0.021 -0.092*** 0.022* -0.292*** -0.480*** -0.247*** -0.336*** 
 (3.098) (-7.159) (-20.438) (-1.548) (-8.304) (1.905) (-25.758) (-38.273) (-15.128) (-4.963) 
Auction House FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 47,910 43,018 77,238 129,110 229,596 277,224 234,020 184,512 71,266 3,517 
adj. R-sq 0.371 0.431 0.410 0.451 0.453 0.479 0.455 0.553 0.631 0.700 
 
Notes: The table reports results for the OLS estimation of a model where the (natural log of) inflation-adjusted sale price is regressed on a gender dummy and a 
series of control variables used in Bocart et al. (2018). Alive is defined equal to one if the artist is alive at the moment of sale. The four regional dummies are 
defined based on the nationality of the artists with the base case equal to “North America”. The model is estimated separately for artists grouped by year of birth. 
We impose the same sample restrictions as in Bocart et al. (2018): artists born after 1250 in Europe or North America, and transaction years after 2000 (ending in 
2016 in our sample). In all models we include auction house fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-
statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Online Appendix 3: The surveys 
In this Appendix, we show screenshots of the surveys we used in the two experiments. Comments 
explaining the purpose of the screenshots are in italics. Table OA2.1 provides descriptive statistics 
for the appreciation scores by guessed gender (Experiment #1) and associated gender (Experiment 
#2). Appendix A describes the inputs into the experiments. 
 
Experiment #1 
Step 1 – Introduction 
Each subject is shown an introductory page that explains the purpose of the experiment. 
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Step 2 – Biographical information 
The survey provider supplies us with basic demographic information on each subject (gender, 
age range, and geographical provenance). Here we augment this set with five survey questions.  
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Steps 3 to 7 – The experiment 
Each subject is shown a random selection of five paintings. For each painting the subject must 
guess gender and place of origin of the painter and approximate creation period of the painting. 
After this, the subject is asked to rate the painting on a 1-10 scale.  
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Step 8 – Conclusion 
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Experiment #2 
Step 1 – Introduction 
Each subject is shown an introductory page that explains the purpose of the experiment.  
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Step 2 – Biographical information 
The survey provider supplies us with basic demographic information on each subject (gender, 
age range, and geographical provenance). Here we augment this set with five survey questions. 
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Steps 3 to 12 – The experiment 
Each subject is shown the ten synthetic images in random order. Each image is randomly 
associated with a male or a female artist name. The subject is asked to rate the painting on a 0-
10 scale.  
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Step 13 – Conclusion 
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Table OA3.1 Summary statistics for experimental data 
Panel A: Experiment #1   Panel B: Experiment #2 










John Alexander Male 5.524 4.506***  1 5.403 5.203*   
(84) (340) 
   
Benny Andrews Male 3.456 2.89**  2 5.273 5.209   
(228) (219) 
   
David Bierk Male 6.409 5.654***  3 5.583 5.556   
(88) (341) 
   
Betty M Bowes Female 5.596 5.497  4 6.269 6.417   
(109) (342) 
   
Oliver Clare Male 5.679 5.743  5 5.959 6.01   
(184) (269) 
   
Nikolai Kozlenko Male 5.921 6.005  6 4.805 4.633   
(228) (194) 
   
Cheryl Laemmle Female 4.649 4.638  7 4.338 4.274   
(174) (282) 
   
Maud Lewis Female 5.046 4.735  8 5.263 5.352   
(130) (291) 
   
Marie Lucie Nessi-Valtat Female 5.466 5.469  9 5.988 5.935   
(281) (145) 
   
Joyce Wahl Treiman Female 4.122 4.019  10 5.675 5.607   
(131) (321) 
   
 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the appreciation scores for the images in our two experiments by guessed 
gender (Experiment #1) and associated gender (Experiment #2). For the first experiment we also report the number of 
female and male guesses each painting received. The table shows the results of t-tests for the difference between the 
average score each painting received by guessed or associated gender. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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